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Abstract 
 
Regional economic development narratives have shifted from focusing on a perennially growing – or at 
least stable – urban core to a more complex and uneven patchwork of localized growth and decline. 
Declining areas have incurred a myriad of symptoms wrought by losses in population and economic 
activity. One symptom has been the abandonment of real property; whether households abandoning over-
leveraged and underwater mortgages, landlords getting out from beneath unprofitable commercial 
structures, or large industrial operations shuttering. In urban areas, large quantities of abandoned real 
property have introduced unique planning and development challenges in American cities, who now find 
themselves implicated in a role they never anticipated filling to great extent: that of landlord. As the 
phenomenon of a land-accumulating public sector has become more common, responsibility and 
deployment of policy for swelling real estate inventories has given cities pause as disposition and 
management strategies become crucial to localities seeking to remain places of continued residence and 
economic activity. Abandoned properties in particular have been perceived as emblematic of inner city 
decline and stagnation, as perpetuating disinvestment and neglect, and even as embodying flaws within 
society at large. On the other hand, abandoned real property is not a de facto death knell; it can also be a 
valuable resource for the public sector. The ultimate leverage and influence a municipality can hold over 
the use and improvement of real property is fee-simple ownership. In higher-rent areas (particularly those 
with annexation capability), this affords municipalities the ability to temper local development markets by 
influencing uses and use patterns that may be out of step with existing market trends. Yet where 
abandoned land exists within fixed municipal boundaries, areas of low development interest, and mass 
population loss, it is much more likely to pose a deleterious influence on a locality’s economic outlook 
and quality of life. Under these latter conditions, public sector strategies to address the detrimental 
qualities of vacancy on its surroundings and allay further decline are open to discourse. 
 
The intersection of urban decline and public surplus land management is a front line of municipal policy 
development. More often than not, land use and development policies exhibit market-serving paradigms 
that have grown to dictate urban governance and policy development over the past half-century. Many 
localities have adopted land banking as a mechanism for the management and disposition of publicly-
owned real estate. Land banking policy has a long history within legal and planning academic circles, yet 
the headlong diffusion of land banking policies across states, counties, and local governments has been a 
more recent phenomenon. This thesis discusses the history of land banking in the United States, its rapid 
expansion as a policy over the past two decades, and the state of the art in a present-day setting. Land 
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banking in its ideal form is then reconciled with land banking in actuality; a case study of “what they say 
they do” versus “what they do”. Through looking at a small number of selected case studies, lessons of 
policies adopted and intended outcomes achieved may serve to better inform stewardship of public real 
estate assets in those cities experimenting with land banking as a spatial fix. Land banking is also 
examined with regard to the policy’s rapid diffusion, in a discussion on the application of policy mobility 
studies to land banking and what land banks reflect in terms of policy mobilities and the ongoing appeal 
of entrepreneurial urban development policy fixes; fixes which benefit certain interests over others, and in 
some instances have perpetuated the same creative destruction that land banks were initially intended to 
allay. Ultimately, land banking as a policy has often embraced the same market-serving ideals that many 
of its proponents have postured against; yet in defining the field, defining the issues within it, and 
exploring possibilities for improvement, there may be new lessons to apply in practice. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Owners of Last Resort 
 
The terms “abandoned”, “vacant”, and “surplus” may all be used in reference to a common concept of 
unwanted, un-allocated, and often publicly-owned real estate. The academic literature has classified 
numerous typologies of vacant land; from environmentally contaminated brownfields, to dimensionally 
constrained development parcels, to reserve land that is not immediately surplus to need, to speculative 
investment holdings (Northam, 1971). Still other classifications or surplus land have been framed with 
economic use and improvement as a main point of reference (Bowman and Pagano, 2004). One particular 
distinction is land which is owned by the public sector. The public sector may not always have the same 
development intentions with land as the private market; and given its longer investment horizon, the 
public sector may seek development outcomes that the free market would not support. This is where 
public development intervention and policy is most palpable, as it puts the public sector’s policy on 
display in the form of what development outcome is manifest on any parcel of vacant land. The origins of 
public sector surplus are manifold, and multi-scalar. Federal and state funding, regional development 
patterns, and social perceptions (Beauregard, 1993) have all been attributed to disinvestment and 
abandonment. Understanding the origins and acquisition methods of public surplus are important in 
understanding the context and implications of surplus. In turn, the context of surplus, whether surplus is 
wanted or unwanted, and from where or what cause the surplus condition originated, is necessary to 
determine strategies addressing the negative effects arising from property abandonment. 
 
The public sector becomes a de facto “owner of last resort” when assuming control of abandoned 
property. Without delving into exogenous factors at this point, abandonment can be conceptualized 
directly as a decision taken when the cost of maintaining or operating a property exceeds its value to the 
owner (Dewar and Weber, 2012). A private landowner’s abandonment of real property may occur due to 
subjective circumstances, though the decision is often an economic one. For example, in New York City’s 
South Bronx, landlords abandoned buildings en masse on account of stagnant local rents, unyielding 
maintenance costs on aging buildings, and draconian code enforcement and tenant recourse policies 
implemented by John V. Lindsay’s mayoral administration during the late 1960s (Jonnes, 1986). 
Financing may also determine a private owner’s ability or desire to maintain ownership of real estate, 
evidenced by widespread property abandonment in the aftermath of the 2008 mortgage foreclosure crisis. 
Liens and ownership structures play a role as well: Compounding the 2008 foreclosure crisis’ effects on 
large-scale abandonment over the past decade, lenders on mortgage-foreclosed properties are 
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disincentivized to complete foreclosure proceedings as it allowed them to deflect responsibility for fines, 
violations, and property taxes onto the mortgagee. Finally, it bears mention that economic decisions are 
not the only contributors to property abandonment, as many properties are abandoned in the wake of 
natural disasters or other cataclysmic events. Hurricane Katrina’s lingering effects on New Orleans 
neighborhoods are documented cases of natural disasters hollowing out urban areas in their entirety 
(Allen, 2015). Irrespective of the means, as owners abandon properties, many cease to continue making 
property tax payments, with properties subsequently foreclosed on by local taxing authorities. Tax 
foreclosure is the most frequent and likely method by which localities become owners of last resort, 
though an overview of public sector acquisition methods merits inclusion for some contextualization. 
 
Acquisition Methods 
 
Acquisition methods offer some insight into the origins of public surplus and the mechanisms utilized. 
While surplus land typologies exist, for the sake of simplicity in this overview, surplus property may 
enter public ownership via creation, targeted acquisition, active receipt, or passive receipt. The first 
category, while it relevant to localities with land infill or annexation capabilities (e.g. San Francisco and 
New York during the early 20
th
 century, or Phoenix in more recent decades, respectively), is arguably 
irrelevant to those cities we may classify as shrinking. In cities experiencing population and economic 
decline, the conscious expansion of geographic boundaries and service provision is neither logical nor a 
phenomenon which bears notable case studies. Given that one of the characteristics of many shrinking 
cities is their challenge in maintaining an adequate level of service provision as depopulation brings 
falling municipal revenues and increasing relative costs of service provision, such expansion of the 
physical environment is likely to be low on the laundry list of more commonly pressing items to address. 
 
Targeted acquisition of properties may be feasible in those cases where resources permit acquisition, and 
indeed can be wielded as a policy option to stave off some of the potential deleterious effects of surplus 
and abandonment. Targeted acquisition may also assist in land assemblage for future planning or projects. 
A targeted acquisition may be the purchase of a parcel of land central to a planned or forthcoming 
neighborhood development project and its subsequent repurposing or inclusion in a broader area plan. 
The purchase itself may be either a public-private transaction, or in some cases in which right-of-first-
refusal exists for tax foreclosed properties, the sale of property from one public administrative body to 
another. For an example of targeted acquisition, a city may purchase one or several specific properties in 
the path of a planned greenway; and though this land may be surplus to city needs in the short-term, there 
is a strategic decision made to add this property to the city’s inventory. In short, targeted acquisition can 
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occur where there are resources (typically financial) available to acquire property through transactional 
exchange, and a clear and distinct motive for acquiring the property exists. 
 
Active receipt, while somewhat similar to targeted acquisition, connotes something less intentional – 
though overlap may certainly exist. However, unlike targeted acquisition, the motive is not as specific and 
the transactional element is less likely to exist. The seizure of a nuisance property under local nuisance 
abatement laws may be considered active receipt; there is an action undertaken to assume control of the 
property, or rather remove control from another actor. A property acquired through active receipt is not 
identified and selected for acquisition; rather, it may be one of a blanket area-wide acquisition, legal 
settlement, or an agreement such as a donation of property or voluntary buy-out program. While targeted 
acquisition properties may remain surplus to outright need, active receipt is more incidental in nature and 
properties acquired through this method are more likely to have little if any strategic value to acquisition; 
active receipt does not involve the conscious decision to acquire a property with an intended purpose in 
mind for the future. 
 
A final means of surplus acquisition is passive receipt. This is typically when a municipality or 
government agency becomes the “owner of last resort”. Properties that are abandoned outright and lost 
through tax foreclosure typically end up in the inventory of the taxing authority, a subsidiary of it, or a 
related governmental or quasi-governmental unit. Following the logic of abandonment, these properties 
have been identified by both private owners and the public sector as having a cost of maintenance 
exceeding the property’s value (whether use or exchange value). These properties tend to be the most 
problematic for localities to deal with; there is little to no interest in holding them, costs are incurred 
through holding them, and more often than not there are economic or procedural barriers to disposition. 
The issue of how to proceed as owner of last resort still tends to be uncharted territory, as municipalities 
have generally not developed over time to play landlord. Maintaining a swelling inventory of vacant land 
is both directly and indirectly costly (GAO, 2011; Han, 2013); however, the absence of maintenance and 
deterioration of public vacant land may provoke those negative social and economic perceptions of 
vacancy that pervade the imaginary. 
 
Public sector surplus acquisition methods can suggest the nature of surplus origins and context; some 
methods are more attributable to shrinking cities, while some are more attributable to growing cities (or 
cities with growth potential). Surplus via creation is typically not associated or affiliated with the latter 
type, for those reasons discussed. Again, the focus here is on shrinking cities – and what the acquisition 
methods of surplus reveal about manifestations of shrinkage. In targeted acquisition scenarios, a 
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shrinkage condition is not implied, though targeted acquisition may be used as a motive to get ahead of 
changing markets and temper development (or disinvestment) outcomes. Active receipt also does not 
necessarily suggest a shrinkage scenario, as the incidences of donations, voluntary buy-outs, or legal 
actions may occur in any place for a variety of reasons. Increasing levels of such active receipt could be 
foretelling of a gradual loss of value or perceived value within a community, which may be influenced by 
or lead to conditions of shrinkage. Passive receipt of surplus is more easily correlated with conditions of 
shrinkage – even if based on purely anecdotal evidence. Shrinkage, manifest in abandonment and 
disinvestment, has a direct influence on vacancy; put another way, large quantities of passively-received 
public surplus land, may be good indicators of other conditions of shrinkage (Beauregard, 1993). 
 
Abandoned Real Estate as Anathema to Shrinking Cities 
 
In many post-industrial, declining, or “legacy cities” of more than 50,000 residents that experienced at 
least a 20% decline from peak population (Brachman & Mallach, 2013), the abandonment of real estate 
contributes to a positive feedback loop in which city administrations increase tax levies to compensate for 
lost property tax revenues and depopulation (increasing per-capita service costs), leading to increasing tax 
foreclosure incidence as owners find their property tax expenditures growing larger than they are willing 
or able to pay, leading to tax foreclosure as a common mechanism by which municipalities become 
owners of last resort. The maintenance costs and spinoff devaluing effects that vacant properties may levy 
on cities and their local or sub-local areas only compound other effects in diminishing local revenue 
sources and budgets. Moreover, in the wake of diminishing federal aid to cities in the decades since the 
Great Society programs of the late 1960s, cities have out of necessity become more reliant on their own 
entrepreneurialism or bootstrapping (Hackworth, 2007; Sutton, 2008) in order to keep the lights on – and 
sometimes quite literally. Given the budgetary restrictions imposed by shrinkage, municipalities 
predictably will tend to take action in removing vacant land from their inventory as expeditiously as 
possible and by any means necessary (Bowman and Pagano, 2004; Hollander, 2011). 
 
Prescriptions on what to do with vacant land from academic literature, consultant groups, and public-
sector policy actors alike are commonly framed by a market perspective; the end result being disposition 
of surplus to private parties or under public-private partnerships to realize revalorization and revenue-
maximizing outcomes. These outcomes often include attaining the highest value in disposition, either in 
terms of transaction price or in terms of the value of subsequent private development. Even prescriptions 
that involve the utilization of vacant land for social purposes, such as the provision or preservation of 
green space as a recreational or aesthetic amenity are couched in quality of life improvements to either 
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retain taxpaying residents or attracting new residents. On its face, this seems rational in the context of 
shedding risk and maintenance responsibilities on one hand, and maximizing revenues in the absence or 
loss of revenues on the other. Vacant properties may also be very dissimilar when accounting for location 
and point in time. At different points in time over the course of the economic development of a region, 
locality, or neighborhood area, the delta of property value may be exponential and rapidly occurring 
(Hackworth, 2007). Some publicly-owned property will remain abandoned unless an owner other than the 
public sector is willing to step up; other property will be subject to high demand and easily disposed at 
market rates. The question is in knowing which properties are or will be in high demand, and which will 
not – and tailoring strategies to fit. 
 
Surplus Strategies and Contextual Difference 
 
Within shrinking urban cores, policies targeting the reutilization or redevelopment of abandoned property 
have enjoyed varied forms of implementation since the 1970s. These policies have typically been 
implemented in conjunction with tax foreclosure reforms, more streamlined public acquisition of tax-
delinquent property, and the formation of local land banking operations (Fishman and Gross, 1972) on the 
assumption that the public sector is better-equipped for promoting idealized development patterns and 
outcomes both locally and regionally. Strategies to this end can include stemming further devaluation and 
abandonment by removing or remediating vacant structures or nuisance property in the public inventory, 
reducing carrying costs and encouraging private redevelopment through the wholesale offloading or 
active marketing of properties, repurposing surplus parcels for other municipal uses (such as recreation), 
or simply holding property for an unspecified period of time until a strategy is determined. Different 
strategies are appropriate for different contexts. In a relatively stable community, the encroachment of 
abandonment may be dealt with preemptively through the approach of nuisance abatement and grounds 
maintenance. Yet after abatement and management, what follows? Surplus public land may exist in a 
local land market with low market demand and very few interested buyers, meaning that it may be very 
difficult or even impossible for the public sector to offload surplus real estate, even at steeply discounted 
prices. It may exist in appreciating areas in which speculation may be occurring, in which case properties 
may well find interested buyers willing to pay market (or market-setting) prices. It may exist in high-
value areas where demand is so great that development outcomes may easily be tailored through 
disposition via development agreements or other interest transfer arrangements. It may finally exist in 
areas of strategic importance for infrastructure, planned public projects, or economic development 
initiatives, in which instance a municipality may make a conscious decision to hold property indefinitely. 
Many municipalities moreover employ quasi-governmental land banks to handle the management and 
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disposition functions of their publicly-owned real estate (Alexander, 2011), though not all cities do so, 
and the capacities and purposes of land banks themselves may similarly vary. 
 
A Brief Introduction to Land Banking 
 
Policies targeting the reutilization or redevelopment of abandoned property have been promoted since the 
1970s, typically in conjunction with tax foreclosure reforms for more streamlined public acquisition and 
the formation of local land banks (Fishman and Gross, 1972). Since the mid-2000s, the creation of local 
land banks as a mechanism for the acquisition, management, and disposition of real estate has spread 
exponentially, a testament to the land bank model’s near-unanimous appeal and ease of transfer among 
municipalities – and particularly those municipalities with high concentrations of abandoned public and in 
rem (i.e. under court jurisdiction, or tax foreclosed) properties. Land banking establishes a local, typically 
public or quasi-public unit responsible for the management and disposition of publicly owned or acquired 
abandoned property. These units serve as a repository for otherwise abandoned or surplus publicly-owned 
land, and work in coordination with public planning, housing, and economic development departments to 
advance development goals through land management and disposition strategies or decisions. Since their 
initial adoption by declining urban areas during the 1970s, land banks have been framed as a means of 
returning tax delinquent properties to revenue-generating taxable use and transferring liability and 
maintenance responsibilities to private owners. Land banks have also emerged as a vehicle for restoring 
economic activity to moribund local or neighborhood development markets. In the words of one 2009 
Cleveland policy report, “Generally, today’s land banks are not intended to replace the operation of 
private markets, but rather to assist where there is a failure of market conditions” (Fitzpatrick, 2009). 
 
The outflow of population and economic activity from urban cores across the U.S. during the post-WWII 
period led to the first land banks being established in St. Louis, MO (1971) and Cleveland, OH (1976) for 
wholesale public acquisition and management of abandoned real property (a more in-depth history of land 
banking in the U.S. is provided in Chapter 2). Though the existing policy literature on land banking is 
broader, other local strategies have been devised by municipalities facing similar economic pressures. For 
example, to preserve housing stock, stabilize neighborhoods, and attract working residents back from the 
suburbs, the City of Baltimore, MD introduced a homesteading program in 1973 under which vacant 
homes acquired by the city would be sold to interested applicants for $1 apiece (Hinds, 1986). Land banks 
have primarily dealt with residential properties and are frequently geared towards re-occupying vacant 
housing, yet land banks in the U.S. play the role of public-private partnership facilitating intermediaries 
on occasion. For example, the Detroit Land Bank Authority (DLBA), one of the largest land banks in the 
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country with an inventory of over 90,000 properties (Poethig, Gastner, et. al, 2017), employs dedicated 
staff for housing and economic development, and maintains a seat at the table in Detroit’s public-private 
development projects. Like other land banks, DLBA also engages in the practice of strategic land 
assembly for development projects. Typically, land assembly involves the institution of “no-sale” zones 
in which properties are held for strategic disposition or repurposing for large-scale development projects 
(as opposed to one-off sales). 
 
Strategies for dealing with surplus property are context-dependent and have changed over time and place. 
Many strategies build upon prior applications or examples; this is demonstrably true in the case of land 
banking, as the primary model instituted by St. Louis in the early 1970s was adopted by other regional 
governments facing mounting issues of depopulation and property abandonment (Alexander, 2011). 
However, the fact that localities have varying mechanisms and government systems surrounding land use 
and ownership is an impediment to outright policy transfer. The outcomes may endure some degree of 
variability amongst different municipalities. Some municipal governments and land banks, including 
those of Baltimore and Atlanta, have partnered with nonprofit agencies or organizations (e.g. Habitat for 
Humanity, in the case of Atlanta) to oversee management and disposition under set guidelines, in 
exchange for direct conveyance of title. Another notable impediment to policy transfer is character of 
housing stock. The housing stock of cities such as St. Louis, Atlanta, Baltimore, and Detroit are typified 
by single-family residential development; whereas in New York City’s abandonment crises of the 1970s 
and 1980s, the city was dealing with a physical context of multi-family dwellings and apartment 
buildings. New York’s preponderance of abandoned multi-family housing necessitated an approach less 
oriented toward promoting homeownership of apartment structures and more oriented toward managing 
what were, in large part, multi-family investment properties. Still more variation comes in the form of 
local tax foreclosure laws, which greatly affects the means by which the public sector often acquires 
abandoned land in the first place. 
 
A final impediment to a guaranteed-results model of municipal surplus land strategy is the condition of 
the local economy or local housing market. Strategies must be tailored to the demand for housing, 
appetite for development, and budgetary constraints of each municipality (HUD, 2014). Public funding 
support is especially critical; through the 1980s and 1990s, New York City benefited from a great deal of 
state-generated financial support for its neighborhood and building rehabilitation programs (Koch, 1985), 
and developers were quite willing to step up to the plate. In many legacy cities, local and supra-local 
support is minimal in the vast majority of neighborhood areas facing high rates of abandonment. Post-
industrial or legacy cities face comparatively greater challenges; and as noted earlier, the housing and 
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foreclosure crisis of the past decade only compounded issues for these cities, which often also endure 
minimal demand for extant surplus real estate. In many cities, another approach to abandoned structures 
in particular has been adopted on a large scale: demolition. The impacts of the 2008 mortgage foreclosure 
crisis on abandonment warranted the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s allocation of Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) funds for the newly-created Hardest Hit Fund, specifically designed to stem the 
negative effects wrought by turmoil in the housing market. While the topic of demolitions merits a 
separate discussion entirely, the focus of this work is on public real estate management and disposition 
through land banking, irrespective of demolition or improvement status. 
 
(Re)Conceptualizing Land Banking 
 
A conceptual framing of public sector surplus real estate disposition strategy may be reduced to the 
tension between embracing a model of socially just and inclusionary development and embracing a post-
Keynesian model of rent-seeking entrepreneurialism. While municipalities-as-landlords and land banks 
have voiced support for such progressive policy outcomes as affordable housing and open redistribution 
of land assets to advance community investment and equity, these aspirational ideations belie other 
components of the bigger picture. For one, land banks in the past and present have relied to varying 
degrees on revenues from property sales to supplement otherwise meager budgets (Alexander, 2011), 
thereby incentivizing exchange value appreciation and rationalizing of market-serving “highest-and-best” 
uses. Land banks have also held onto property for extended periods of time despite community opposition 
and demand for access to publicly-owned real estate assets, in order to strategically accumulate property 
for large-scale sales to developers and industrial users alike (Alexander, 2011; Alvarez and Samuel, 
2018). Over the past 75 years, land banking as an ideal has evolved from a Keynesian exercise in exerting 
control over market-serving development patterns, to a market-serving mechanism for land revalorization, 
to an activity that is as susceptible to governmental abuse as any prior Keynesian intervention in land 
development regulation. Chapter 5 discusses land banking praxis through case studies of the nation’s 
largest land banking operations by area and portfolio, taking stock of their embodiment of entrepreneurial 
approaches, and how land banking may benefit certain resident groups and stakeholders at the expense of 
others. At face value, land banks have been promoted as a means of counteracting the detrimental effects 
of vacancy, unlocking the potential of otherwise unused real property assets, and catalyzing holistic 
community development efforts. Yet the operationalization of land banking thus far has also borne an 
equal measure of closed-door decision making and disposition strategies favoring property revalorization 
and business interests. Whether land banks are a creature of the public sector or the private sector is up for 
debate; and indeed, there is a delicate balance and nuance between land banks being considered as 
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inherently quasi-public – seeking public benefits and equitable development – or quasi-private – focusing 
on short-term returns and market profitability – strategies. 
 
Critique and Structure of Study 
 
Incidence of real estate abandonment in historically disinvested areas will not diminish in visibility or 
relevance for the foreseeable future, and large-scale municipal owners of last resort will remain 
challenged with surplus management and disposition strategies. Shrinking or “legacy” cities are the most 
vulnerable to the negative consequences of abandonment, yet also exist at the forefront of new policy 
creation and experimentation given the sheer amount of public lands many hold in inventory. While many 
policies have been crafted from example, the most visible examples of cities that have transitioned from 
high to low abandonment through successful reuse or repurposing of public surplus lands (e.g. New York) 
have embraced approaches that either benefited from high levels of public financial support or were 
decidedly entrepreneurial in their underlying approaches to development policy. The balance of strategic 
positioning for economic growth and targeted quality of life improvements versus a more human capital 
oriented approach of economic development through persons as a means and an end (Malizia and Feser, 
1999) is a delicate one in the pragmatic world of inter-jurisdictional competition and the ever-shifting 
economic fortunes of America’s legacy cities. The future of surplus real estate disposition and its 
intersection with economic development and housing policy may go either way; and different approaches 
will work for different places. The topic of this discussion merits further investigation than is possible in 
this thesis, though based on a cursory overview of equity concerns and public discord in cities such as 
Detroit, which are experimenting with more place-as-ends approaches, a greater appreciation and embrace 
of more equitable policy and strategies involving nonprofit institutional partners, community assistance, 
and fair and transparent management and disposition may be more appropriate – or at the very least, less 
potentially hypocritical – in cities still reeling from the ravages of deindustrialization. 
 
The history of land banking in the United States is explored in Chapter 2 of this thesis. Land banking 
policy emanated from a tradition of Keynesian land use controls and private market interventions. Along 
the way, while the foundational concept of a public entity effectively controlling land development under 
its ownership has not changed, other aspects of land banking have. Land banking’s policy development is 
underscored by case study milestones, from the first writings on land banking policy in the 1940s to the 
accelerated adaptation of land banking into a policy model that has influenced the creation of a multitude 
of local land banks since the mid-2000s. Part of the reason for land banking’s latter-day success was its 
broad appeal as a policy, being embraced by policymakers across political parties, real estate interest 
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groups, philanthropies, and non-profit and non-governmental organizations alike. Chapter 3 pertains to 
land banking itself as a case study in the field of policy mobilities, and why and how land banking policy 
has diffused and mutated to the extent that it has over the past two decades. As this study argues, there are 
manifold reasons for land banking’s unchallenged success as a spatial policy fix. Chapter 4 contains a 
discussion on land banking’s promises to the very stakeholders that catalyzed its diffusion, and questions 
whether or not land banks have lived up to these promises. While land banking has been advertised as a 
vehicle for social justice, community stabilization, and mitigating the harm caused by abandonment 
(Mallach and Vey, 2011), in practice land banks may achieve contrary effects. To this end, Chapter 5 
entails quantitative and qualitative assessments of land banking (and non-land banking) case studies to 
illustrate how land banking policy has been operationalized, and what lessons can be learned or 
incorporated in future land banking policy development. 
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Chapter 2: A History of Land Banking in the U.S. 
1900s-1960s: Controlling Growth 
 
Assembling “large, contiguous areas of land under public control” was proposed in the U.S. as early as 
the 1940s by urban planning and legal scholars, among the first to call for a form of institutionalized land 
banking policy (Yale Law School, 1943). These prototypical policy recommendations were described as 
 
“…a measure deemed basic to sound city building by consensus of professional planning opinion… 
[though] will clearly be difficult in a country where real estate is characteristically in many small 
ownerships and where a lingering laissez-faire philosophy resists any modification of an individual 
owner’s property rights.” (Yale Law School, 1943) 
 
The argument for public land ownership was that it represented ultimate control over land use, while 
leaving development to the free market would ultimately lead to unfavorable outcomes such as 
deterioration of central city areas, real estate speculation, and the improper apportioning of land uses to 
sustain stable urban and regional development. In these early policy studies on land banking, acquisition 
was operationalized through exercise of eminent domain, rather than purchase or donation; assuming that 
the public sector could be ensured to promote the greater public good, foreshadowing many of the 
arguments used in the landmark Berman v. Parker decision. From the outset land banking was studied as 
a matter of land use law, concerning itself with the need to streamline the condemnation and acquisition 
of property due to tax delinquency. The basic idea has endured over the past eight decades; however, 
early land acquisition prescriptions were predicated on growth and control over growth, whereas the first 
actual American land banks were reactively designed to combat urban decline. Put differently, early land 
banks were envisioned to acquire property via creation, targeted acquisition, and active receipt, while land 
banks in practice (especially early on) would primarily receive property via passive receipt. 
 
It bears mention that land banking is not an American innovation. Since earlier in the 20
th
 century, land 
banks existed established in Sweden, The Netherlands, and Denmark to control development and temper 
speculative real estate markets, and particularly private speculation over forthcoming public-sector 
infrastructure projects. In Sweden and Denmark, this meant pre-emptively acquiring land in future 
development areas, and selling or leasing acquired land at below-market prices only after a project had 
been announced (Fishman and Gross, 1972). The disposition mechanism was most often via ground lease; 
Swedish cities used the ground-lease model extensively until the classical liberal climate of the early 19
th
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century effectuated a change in general disposition policy to sale over leasing, which endured through the 
19
th
 century (Atmer, 1987).  After moving to re-acquire land during the late 19
th
 century, Sweden reversed 
course, and by disposing of property via ground lease, Sweden was able to levy and maintain considerable 
influence over land development patterns (Atmer, 1987). In these early international case studies, land 
banking was married to other land use controls including building permitting, use regulations, and the 
antecedents of urban growth boundaries. U.S. land banks, proposed well after its northern European 
counterparts, were spun off from general land use controls that gained use during early 20
th
 century, with 
zoning in particular. As case in point, the land banking policies being proposed in the 1940s were 
intended to function in lockstep with a municipal planning agency. Yet given America’s longstanding 
tradition of real property rights, land banking of the type employed by Sweden, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands would have been difficult to employ. Rather, land banks would ideally develop in the same 
vein as zoning, as a method of stabilizing and protecting property values (Fishman and Gross, 1972). 
 
1960s-1990s: Managing Decline 
 
Until the 1960s, land banking remained an esoteric topic, discussed in law and urban policy studies as a 
means of controlling future development. The idea of land banking could be scaled regionally to address 
emerging patterns of suburban sprawl, as well as locally to fulfill desires to control urban development 
within urban cores or neighborhood areas. Land banking could be used conveniently to influence urban 
development, offering the ability to incentivize private development in core areas (i.e. discounting land 
sale prices for select public and private projects) and depress values in areas of high speculation through 
below-market sales near the urban periphery. In a 1972 policy study, Richard Fishman and Robert Gross 
of Case Western University posited that land banking could further influence development outcomes by 
delaying disposition while strategies were devised (or conditions realized) for immediate and efficient 
redevelopment, promoting the “non-use of land for an indefinite period of time” while awaiting idealized 
development or disposition conditions to arise (Fishman and Gross, 1972). Intentional delay would allow 
time to review proposals by private developers, provide necessary infrastructure resources, and modify 
plans to conform to changing conditions. Banked land outside of active redevelopment areas would also 
be developed for low- and moderate-income housing for those displaced by land clearance by urban 
renewal. Yet in contrast to urban renewal, land banking would be a multi-jurisdictional, regional effort. 
Fishman and Gross also promoted establishing independent land banking entities “unconstrained by state 
and local politics” to make land use decisions. Yet while land banking was still being envisioned by the 
early 1970s as a quasi-governmental activity on the scale of controlling regional development growth, in 
practice it was being taken up increasingly locally and by declining communities. 
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By the 1960s, symptoms of urban population shrinkage were beginning to manifest in many cities – most 
notably the abandonment of real property, conditions which led to the creation of the first formal land 
bank in St. Louis, Missouri. St. Louis’ population had declined over 25% between its 1950 peak and the 
early 1970s. While out-migration from St. Louis continued, the physical building stock for a much larger 
population remained. A swelling proportion of abandoned real property resulted, with many properties 
delinquent on property taxes and subject to public foreclosure. That St. Louis did not possess annexation 
capabilities further precluded it from engaging in the type of land banking intended to manage regional 
growth (Langsdorf, 1973); moreover, the City of St. Louis had difficulty gaining control of abandoned 
and tax delinquent property, as the tax foreclosure process was burdensome and often yielded clouded 
property titles. The Missouri legislature was receptive to mounting concerns over St. Louis’ growing 
property abandonment and local government’s difficulty in acquiring abandoned properties, and in 
response passed the Municipal Land Reutilization Law in 1971, facilitating the foreclosure and sale of 
tax-delinquent properties and establishing a public corporation authorized to acquire, hold, manage, and 
sell tax-foreclosed properties for which no private owner had bid in the county sheriff’s tax foreclosure 
auction (Spalding and Duda, 2011). The St. Louis LRA was well-received in its potential to unlock a 
large municipal inventory of land for private development, with the assumption that the city would incur 
– and not pass on – costs related to land preparation (i.e. demolition, assemblage) to developers 
(Langsdorf, 1973). However, the LRA became dogged by policy oversights; among these oversights 
being the acquisition and disposition of occupied properties that had been tax foreclosed, with public 
relations and management challenges dampening early perceptions of success (Spalding and Duda, 2011). 
 
St. Louis, of course, was not alone in its contemporary predicament or approach. In Cleveland, Ohio, 
widespread abandonment imposed similar pressure on city finances given declining tax revenues and 
increasing maintenance costs for derelict and deteriorating property. Ohio’s property tax foreclosure laws 
having been devised in the throes of the Great Depression, provided leniency for property owners 
temporarily unable to meet tax obligations in mind and deliberately drawing out the foreclosure process. 
As a result, in the early 1970s, the City of Cleveland Planning Commission found that it took an average 
of nine years for tax-delinquent property to be formally foreclosed and offered for resale in county 
auctions (Krumholz, 1990). Norm Krumholz, then Director of the Cleveland Planning Commission, 
proposed streamlining reforms to the tax foreclosure process and the establishment of a municipal land 
bank. Krumholz and a coalition of public officials, business associations, and local newspapers lobbied 
Ohio’s state legislature for the passage of House Bill 1327, which would codify the proposed changes. To 
Krumholz’s own admission, the legislation that eventually passed in 1976 was modeled off of the St. 
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Louis LRA (Krumholz, 1990), creating the Cleveland Land Reutilization Program (CLRP). A 1978 
policy study focusing on Cleveland aptly surmised a future in which the CLRP may end up owning large 
portions of a city. Assuming that manufacturing industries would continue abandoning cities, the study 
offered that cities could use such large inventories to properly reinvent and revitalize certain areas 
(Hemann, 1978). In St. Louis and Cleveland, the application of land banking mutated land banking’s 
originally intended role. Whereas land banks were historically intended to control regional growth 
outcomes, the LRA and CLRP examples offered the ability of land banking to cut administrative costs, 
provide market access to tax foreclosed properties, and – eventually – return abandoned properties to 
taxable use in declining or increasingly abandoned areas. 
 
Land banking’s development and expansion occurred gradually between the 1970s and 1990s. Over time, 
the LRA and CLRP began to realize unanticipated growing pains, nominally lack of funding sources and 
coordination with separate county taxing bodies – particularly in Ohio, which unlike St. Louis was not a 
self-contained county unit. In 1988, Ohio’s land banking laws were revised to further streamline the tax 
foreclosure process and increase funding for foreclosure activities. The advances included reserving a 5% 
fee on delinquent tax collections to fund computerized record-keeping, the abatement of prior tax 
delinquencies on land bank-owned parcels, and the slackening of foreclosure notice requirements 
(Fitzpatrick, 2009). Incorporating intergovernmental agreements to establish regional land banking 
coordination was innovated by the next new land banks in Louisville, KY (1989) and Atlanta, GA (1991), 
respectively. Similarly, Louisville and Atlanta devised land banks to address abandoned tax-delinquent 
properties, though with minimal differences in applications (i.e. the Fulton County / Atlanta Land Bank 
Authority was formed as a nonprofit corporation rather than a public-sector entity). Kentucky’s land bank 
enabling legislation enabled creation of land banks as independent public corporations created pursuant to 
inter-local agreements among key governmental entities (Alexander, 2005). The main limitations to this 
“first generation” land banks included inchoate funding and administrative mechanisms, lack of 
coordination with other governmental entities, and lack of bandwidth for disposition processes 
(Alexander, 2015). So delimited in ability, early land banks found themselves struggling to keep up, and 
despite the nascent revitalization of downtown districts during the 1990s, localized abandonment 
continued to swell public inventories with tax-delinquent and abandoned real estate (Han, 2014).  
 
2002-2004: The Genesee County Project 
 
By the late 1990s, land bank enabling statutes still only existed in four states. Michigan would soon join 
the fray in a major way, its innovations and successes ushering in a period of exponential policy diffusion 
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that has only accelerated in the wake of the 2008 housing foreclosure crisis. During the 1990s, many 
Michigan cities experienced familiar financial struggles stemming from depopulation and property 
abandonment. In 1999, the Citizens Research Council of Michigan (CRC), with assistance from the 
University of Michigan, released a policy report entitled “Delinquent Property Taxes as an Impediment to 
Development in Michigan”, which advanced tax foreclosure reform working in tandem with location-
based incentive programs to facilitate redevelopment in disinvested and typically urban areas (CRC, 
1999). The CRC’s report advanced a number of policy recommendations aimed at reforming county-level 
handling of property tax delinquency and foreclosure disposition. Sweeping reforms to the foreclosure 
and public acquisition process were intended to expedite tax foreclosure and property resale, though did 
not specifically call for the practice of land banking to occur; even referencing case studies of Cleveland 
and Cuyahoga County, land banking was mentioned only twice in CRC’s report as a means of holding 
land for future use or reserving property for local community groups (CRC, 1999). Michigan’s state 
government passed its Public Act 123 that year, incorporating many of the report’s recommendations on 
reconstituting and accelerating the tax foreclosure process. Michigan’s local governments, now able to 
acquire tax delinquent property more expediently, sought ways to use the new law to their advantage. 
 
The first local government to operationalize Public Act 123 was that of Genesee County. Following the 
act’s passage, Genesee County Treasurer Dan Kildee quickly mobilized to expand the application of the 
law beyond accelerated property acquisition, to include land banking. Genesee County’s urgency to apply 
PA 123 was inspired largely by its issues in Flint, an auto-industry city long anchored by General Motors 
production facilities. Like many other deindustrializing cities in the upper Midwest, General Motors’ 
exodus from Flint beset the city with immense destabilizing effects. Yet owing to the concentration of 
industry and capital that had existed, Flint remained a node for philanthropic organizations with ties to 
automakers that had since largely abandoned the city. With the support of local philanthropies and 
national think tanks, and cooperation among the municipal units within and including Genesee County, 
the Genesee County Land Reutilization Council (LRC) was established in 2002 (Kildee, 2003). The LRC 
improved on prior land bank models by establishing a dedicated funding source from tax foreclosure 
collection and sales proceeds, and collaborating with the University of Michigan on long-range county 
planning efforts to more strategically utilize assets controlled by the LRC (Kildee, 2003). LRC’s 
dedicated funding stream provided financial support, though more than anything LRC’s founding context, 
replete with connections to philanthropy, educational institutions, and ambitious public officials, enabled 
it to succeed where its predecessors had not. Building off a visible momentum carried by Flint and 
Genesee County, in 2003 Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm signed Michigan’s formal enabling act 
for the creation of land banks, PA 258 or the Land Bank Fast Track Act (LBFTA) into law, allowing for 
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the creation of land banks at the state, county, and city level, with an emphasis on the City of Detroit 
(Bailey, Fisher, et. al. 2006). The LBFTA formalized land banks, allowing for the expansion of their 
jurisdiction and operational sustainability, and crucially allowed for local land banks to borrow money 
and issue bonds, given that funding had long been one of the greatest challenges to land banks. 
 
2004-Present: Land Banking in the Lime Light 
 
By the mid-2000s, a growing number of policymakers began taking note of the potential for land banking 
to promote community stabilization and economic development in declining urban areas. States with 
existing land banks revisited and revised their programs, and comparative case studies in search of best 
practice or boilerplate applications began in earnest. The City of Cleveland commissioned Cleveland 
State University to put together one such ‘best practices’ study in 2005. The Cleveland State University 
study is worth noting here, as despite echoing many findings from prior land banking policy studies, its 
selected case studies, approach, and innovations foreshadowed other eventual applications of land 
banking. The study surveyed 34 land banks or land bank-oriented entities (many of the examples were not 
formal land bank authorities) in the U.S., evidencing the extent of land banking’s dispersal by the mid-
2000s (GLEFC, 2005). This study favored market-based approaches to land banking, robust public-
private partnerships, streamlined acquisition processes, and a “corporate” land bank structure divorced 
from the requisite bureaucratic functions or accountability that would normally apply in public-sector real 
estate management and disposition activity (GLEFC, 2005). The researchers also surveyed managers of 
existing land banking operations taking stock of policy approaches; perhaps unsurprisingly, most 
managers surveyed indicated that their operations targeted area-specific redevelopment to return land to 
value-generating use, and that lack of demand or attracting buyers was one of the greatest challenges 
faced. Greater diversity emerged with regard to funding sources, resources for property identification, and 
annual activity (GLEFC, 2005). Geographically, a majority of land banks surveyed existed in northeastern 
or Midwestern states and cities, a trend which has only continued in the years since (see Figure 1). 
 
Think tanks, philanthropies, and policy experts were quick to embrace the unrealized potential for land 
banks, inspired largely by Genesee County’s lauded 2002 model and the 2003 Michigan LBFTA. The 
Genesee Institute, a policy think tank spun off by Dan Kildee from the reorganized Genesee County Land 
Bank (GCLB) of 2004, was devised to provide technical assistance to other counties in assisting their own 
creation and/or implementation of land bank authorities, and received funding from the Flint-based C.S. 
Mott Foundation (C.S. Mott Foundation, 2005). 2005 also marked the release of the most influential land 
banking policy report to this day, Land Bank Authorities: A Guide for the Creation and Operation of 
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Local Land Banks by Emory University law professor Frank Alexander. Alexander’s 2005 report 
specifically laid out the necessary steps to creating a municipal land bank authority, thereby creating the 
first portable policy model for land banking and entering land banking into the policy limelight. Land 
Bank Authorities was one of the first instances of national think tanks promoting land banking promoted 
as a ready-made policy innovation, with think tanks from Smart Growth America and the Brookings 
Institution providing platforms for the further dispersal of land banking policy. While Alexander’s report 
promoted the creation of quasi-public land bank authorities much as Fishman and Gross had attempted to 
do three decades prior, Alexander’s policy recommendations were far more actionable and consequential 
than Fishman and Gross’ study had been in 1972. The reasons for land banking’s breakaway success 
following the creation of the Genesee County Land Bank are discussed further in the following chapter, 
though it is safe to say that there were many extant conditions for this success; put simply, the policy’s 
future without Genesee County would have been far less clear (Dubb, 2009). 
 
By the mid-2000s, land banking policies had the backing of myriad stakeholder groups within public, 
private and non-profit sectors, at various scales of government, and with the collective power to rapidly 
and effectively advance policy implementation. Think tanks, and the policy networks they permeated, 
were instrumental in the process. In addition to the Genesee Institute, Smart Growth America established 
its National Vacant Properties Campaign to further policy research and implementation support for vacant 
land strategies, with a particular focus on land banking. Prominent figures in academia and philanthropy 
alike were animated by discussions of vacant land policy and the potential for land banking to effectuate a 
more just future for disinvested urban areas, as excerpts from the inaugural National Vacant Properties 
Campaign conference in 2007 indicated. Alan Mallach, a noted expert on urban shrinkage and architect of 
the “legacy cities” concept, set the tone of this conference by declaring that “Vacant property is not a 
victimless crime” (Schamess, 2007). Land banking picked up momentum as a silver bullet; a policy fix 
that would return control to the public sector with the support of philanthropy, and carrying with it a 
message of social justice and equity (if only by default). By the late 2000s, land banking operations had 
reached such “best practice” prominence as to merit inclusion in HUD’s Neighborhood Stabilization 
Program (NSP) as applicable local funding uses. Indeed, as a byproduct of the newly-instated Obama 
Administration’s 2008 Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA), the NSP was the first instance of 
federal support provided explicitly for the creation and maintenance of local land banking operations; and 
it is little surprise that one of the most active voices in the creation and refinement of NSP was Genesee 
County Treasurer Dan Kildee (Dubb, 2009). 
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Land banks flourished after the implosion of the national home mortgage market and economic recession 
of the late 2000s and early 2010s. The growth in number of land banks illustrates the rapidity of land 
banking’s spread post-Genesee County LRC and second wave of expansion post-housing crisis. Prior to 
the LRC, only four land banks existed in the U.S.; by 2008-2009, the number of land banks had grown to 
over 75 (Dubb, 2009); and by 2015, over 120 land banks were known to exist nationwide, most of which 
are concentrated in the northeast and upper Midwest (Figure 1) (CCP, 2015). In 2009, the National 
Vacant Properties Campaign and the Genesee Institute merged to form the Center for Community 
Progress (CCP), which remains the primary authority on land banking policy development and research. 
Given that majority of post-GCLB land banks have in one way or another built off of Frank Alexander’s 
model, CCP enjoys a veritable monopoly on land banking policy development and resources. Many of 
these land banks have championed innovative approaches to land management, acquisition, and 
disposition of real estate; and given the myriad of figures and narratives corroborating land banking’s 
success, the policy maintains a “best practice” status endorsed by local, state, and federal levels of 
government. In light of its sterling reputation, public, private, and philanthropic sources also continue to 
offer support for local land banks. Curiously, few studies have examined the indirect and potentially 
socially regressive effects that land banks have occasionally wrought, though this has more recently been 
tacitly acknowledged by policy think tanks and watchdogs alike (Graziani, 2016; Davis, 2012). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: LAND BANKS ACROSS THE U.S. 
Image Source: Center for Community Progress 
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Chapter 3: Land Banks on the Move 
Policy Development and Mobility in Land Banking 
 
The management and disposition of surplus municipal vacant land is an area in which research on policy 
transfer and mobility betrays a good deal of vacancy on its own. While academic and consulting literature 
on vacant urban land and municipal surplus is aplenty, there is a paucity of research on how case studies, 
best practices, and full-scale research publications on the topic of management and disposition strategy 
influence policy development and implementation. These vacancies in the research include manifold 
unanswered questions of how and why surplus land strategies are or were created, how and why or by 
whom they are or were evaluated, and how strategies and policies have developed both horizontally and 
vertically across government structures. This incipient exercise in elucidating policy origins traces 
development of surplus land management and disposition strategies, attempts to contextualize this policy 
development through time and space, and provides an overview of the literature surrounding public 
surplus land policy with an emphasis on land banking in particular. This exercise also attempts to apply 
lessons from the body of research and theoretical development surrounding policy transfer and mobility to 
land banking and related strategies, suggesting that studying the policy mobility of land banking may 
reveal broader trends in governance evading its own shadow. 
 
Given the variety of approaches, levels of government, and local or state laws to contend with, the 
development of management and disposition strategies has occurred in different directions and to 
different ends. Again, most of the extant literature follows the development of land banks, which have 
become increasingly popular. Early land banks lacked coordination with other legislative mechanisms, 
such as property tax collection and foreclosure, and were typically one with the city governments in 
which they operated, thereby limiting operational flexibility (Alexander, 2015). Between the 1970s and 
1990s, land banks in the U.S. began growing in number. Increasingly fragmented regional economic 
development exacerbating a spatial patchwork of winners and losers (Hackworth, 2007), combined with 
changes in federal funding structures and programs available to fund municipal land stewardship meant 
that abandonment was becoming more visible and direr in more places. In 1999, the Michigan State 
Legislature enacted sweeping reforms of tax foreclosure processes statewide following two successive 
reports on the topic of tax foreclosure reform published by the University of Michigan School of Public 
Policy and the Citizens Research Council of Michigan, respectively (CRC, 1999). These studies, which 
focused mostly on Detroit, were conducted in response to growing concern over the amount of abandoned 
property within urban areas. Nonprofits and community organizations have also stepped up to influence 
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local policy adoption. For example, the Pennsylvania Horticultural Society advanced recommendations 
for urban vacant land strategies in a 1995 report; many recommendations for the City of Philadelphia, 
which had previously conducted its own study, were put into practice (Hughes, 2000). Following last 
decade’s mortgage foreclosure crisis, and with an amplified platform through national organizations such 
as CCP and HUD, land banking has only spread as a preferred policy application for dealing with 
increasing vacancy and surplus. 
 
Land Banks in Motion 
 
The diffusion of public surplus land management strategies has increasingly manifested in applications of 
the successful land banking model. The malleability of the land banking model, with administration and 
priorities set by local land banks, is worth examining in the different roles which land banks may fill, why 
they may appeal to different local governing bodies, and how they are applied by and in localities. The 
paucity of sources for land bank research and point-source policy promotion also entertains the questions 
of whose agenda is reflected in applications of the land banking strategy, and who, if anyone, stands to 
benefit. Local nuances in applications and ends met suggest that land banking should be examined 
through the lens of policy mobility as opposed to policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2012). This may 
be a curious approach, as land banking can more easily be viewed at face value meeting many 
characteristics of policy transfer seminally advanced by Dolowitz and Marsh. The goals of land banking 
are easily articulated and applied, and its diffusion as a policy approach has been led by research groups, 
civil servants, and policy experts (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Land banking policy adoption can also be 
considered both voluntary and as a result of indirect coercion, as adoption of quasi-public land banks in 
cities across the U.S. dealing with large surpluses of abandoned real property have created a consensus 
over a common policy solution, putting pressure on non-adopters (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). 
 
Philadelphia, PA provides a useful case study of the tension between coercion and adoption. Tracing the 
2013 adoption of the Philadelphia land bank, the 1995 Pennsylvania Horticultural Society (PHS) report 
was first to lay groundwork and advance goals to consolidate fragmented public land ownership and 
disposition. Subsequently, many PHS suggestions were reiterated in studies by think tanks, which 
typically drew on the work of a select few policy experts (Hughes, 2000). The influence of think tanks 
and their cited (or resident experts) as non-governmental agents of policy transfer has been noted in the 
policy transfer literature (Stone, 2000). Moreover, the turn-key nature of land bank policy reports 
produced by non-governmental agents and promoted by governmental agents facilitates their adoption, as 
governing bodies seek solutions to growing issues of land abandonment; yet as governing bodies are 
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routinely presented with or pressured to adopt land banking policy by external groups, elements of 
indirect coercion may be involved on a case-by-case basis. Dolowitz and Marsh split the difference 
between lesson drawing (“perfect rationality”) and coercion in their characterization of a “bounded 
rationality” (2000, 14). Back to the example at hand, the Philadelphia City Council’s approval of a local 
land bank was the result of continuous lobbying pressure for adoption by builders, neighborhood civic 
associations, realtors, architects, environmental groups, and community organizations (Gunther, 2013), 
displaying elements of both voluntary and coerced adoption. Differences in adoption mechanisms, scalar 
power dynamics, and local political nuances suggest that to trace and understand the extent of land 
banking’s spread as a policy for managing public surplus land the conventional political science 
approaches to policy transfer should be eschewed for a policy mobilities approach (McCann and Ward, 
2013). To this end, one of the main unanswered questions left to ask concerns the ideological and 
institutional contexts within which land banking policies exist. 
 
What Can We Learn? 
 
One of the features of land banks, as they have been devised and implemented in the U.S., is that they are 
depicted as serving a public good – and for good reason. Studies have shown the efficacy of land banks, 
and they have generally been reported as policy successes, albeit mostly by experts in the policy area 
(Dewar, 2015; Alexander, 2015). They also are intended to be divorced from the bureaucratic functions of 
local governments, and thereby have less accountability and wielding power to circumvent bureaucracy-
as-usual. Public surplus land policy development, with land banking leading the field, is still growing 
across space and time. Studying this policy area with an eye towards policy mobility may provide insights 
into how ideological and institutional contexts influence an area in which the public sector at one time has 
minimal and maximal control over inventory strategy and disposition choices. Research into this field 
may also corroborate Diane Stone’s exploration of think tanks and their influence in promoting 
privatization strategies (2000, 51). Central to most approaches being undertaken with regard to public 
land management and disposition is a common theme of either separating bureaucratic or governmental 
functions related to surplus land management and disposition into dedicated quasi-public or even private 
functions which are, by nature, not as accountable to the public at large. Moreover, the mutation of land 
banking policy as it is applied from place to place to meet different ends (NYC Office of the Comptroller, 
2016), despite the conventional purpose of land banking as a means of addressing abandonment and 
vacancy, may reveal developments in the policy area heretofore unstudied. The spread of policy 
documents advancing land banking policy by U.S. nonprofits and think tanks, which have been translated 
into other languages for international consumption (Alexander, 2015), is also an area unexplored. 
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Land Banking Policy Diffusion 
 
The proliferation of U.S. land banking policy and research over the past two decades merits a separate 
discussion on the creation, mutability, and diffusion of the modern-day land bank. As a means of dealing 
with municipalities’ most permanent and potentially most valuable asset, land banks fill (or may fill) a 
crucial role in planning and development, particularly in areas with an overabundance of tax-delinquent 
or publicly-owned vacant land. The activities of land banks, formal or informal, authorities or otherwise, 
are subtle enough to slip under the radar of general public consciousness barring a publicized expose of 
corruption or unfair practices. The narrative of land banking delivered through countless working papers 
and policy conferences over the past two decades depicts a benign, if not beneficial, policy innovation for 
any number of locales facing widespread abandonment. Yet there is more to the narrative than cursory 
overview, and there are lessons evidenced by the development of land banking policy since the late 
1990s. Approaching the development of land banking through the lens of policy mobility affords a better 
understanding of why land banks have become a buzzword within land use planning and community 
revitalization policy circles, and there are certainly policy mobility lessons evidenced by the development 
of land banking. Land banking also provides an illustrative example of policy development in the U.S. as 
articulated by John Kingdon in his studies on political institutions in the U.S. The following chapter 
traces the proliferation of modern-day U.S. land banks from the Genesee County model and the actors 
behind its policy development; specifically, the “policy streams” that enabled its adoption in Michigan (or 
the context under which land banking came into favor), and the mutation of U.S. land banking policy 
based on intrinsic and extrinsic factors that may influence its mutability. 
 
Problems, Politics, and Policy: A Kingdonian Conceptualization 
 
Land banking’s post-millennial diffusion in the U.S. can be handily traced back to Genesee County, 
Michigan, which created a prototypical Land Reutilization Council after sweeping tax foreclosure reforms 
were made at the state level in 1999. While land banking had been implemented by a handful of localities 
in other states decades prior, it had not reached the critical mass necessary to take it beyond a local policy 
adoption to a nationwide best practice. A discussion of land banking’s policy diffusion origins will thus 
inevitably revolve around Flint, Genesee County, and the State of Michigan; however, examining the key 
players and contextual factors behind Michigan’s appreciable policy pioneering reveal both local and 
non-local influences, as well as cross-jurisdictional policy entrepreneurialism. In toto, the context within 
which Genesee County’s land bank materialized was uniquely well-suited to the policy’s success and 
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diffusion. Borrowing from the writings of John Kingdon, the conditions for Michigan’s passage of the PA 
123 tax foreclosure reform law in 2000 and the Genesee County Land Reutilization Council’s 
establishment in 2002 can be framed in three streams of policy adoption; problems, politics, and policy. 
The origin of the Genesee County Land Bank (GCLB) can be construed as the intersection of a problem 
deemed to need policy attention, the political motivation and opportunity to bring forth a solution, and an 
available policy solution to the problem; the intersection of the three streams creates a “policy window” 
through which the policy takes shape and becomes implemented (Kingdon, 1984). 
 
The Problem 
 
The problems faced by Flint, Genesee County, and many other Michigan localities by the late 1990s were 
by no means unique or locally specific. Negative effects on municipal tax revenues and operating budgets 
caused by deindustrialization, population loss, disinvestment and abandonment were already well 
established in many northeastern and Midwestern localities. Abandonment took on a particular focus as 
outmigration led to concentrations of abandoned and tax-delinquent property that the public sector had 
limited control over, crippled property tax revenues, further exacerbated patterns of disinvestment, and 
contributed to added maintenance and service provision costs. Michigan’s identification of property 
abandonment as a problem in need of policy attention followed largely in the footsteps of other states, 
including Missouri, Ohio, Kentucky, and Georgia. A general focusing of disinvestment in localized urban 
areas was becoming increasingly discernible in the collective public mind (Beauregard, 1993), even if the 
specific problem of tax delinquent property abandonment was arguably more nuanced. In Michigan, state 
and federal policy fixes had been deployed by the early 1990s to address disinvestment in declining or 
economically forlorn areas through location-based financial incentives (CRC, 1999). Yet one of the 
unturned obstacles to reinvestment remained abandoned property, trapped in the purgatory of tax 
delinquency with little to no public sector recourse. 
 
The publishing of the Citizens’ Research Council of Michigan’s Delinquent Property Taxes as an 
Impediment to Development in Michigan in 1999 was the comprehensive, formal articulation of a 
problem that had been manifest for some time prior. Rather than examining the contents of the report, it 
may be more salient to note the relevance of the CRC itself, as the CRC’s small size and relative 
obscurity as a local policy research institute belies its influence on Michigan’s legislature. Borne from the 
Progressive era of the early 20th century, CRC was but one of many local and privately-funded 
governmental research organizations nationwide seeking to combat the excesses, corruption, and 
inequities that gripped municipal governments (Derringer, 2016). CRC would develop and solidify its 
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reputation as both an impartial government watchdog and a purveyor of policy fixes based in high-quality 
nonpartisan research. CRC’s ready accessibility at the state level, focus on state and local policies, and the 
general acceptance of its policy research and prescriptions gradually expanded its role as a resource for 
policymakers. The Michigan Constitutional Convention of 1961-1962 was a defining moment in CRC’s 
influence, through which findings and recommendations of CRC policy papers analyzing the constitution 
and related issues were adopted into the state constitution itself (Derringer, 2016). Policymakers in 
Michigan looking for policy problems or solutions have often since turned an ear towards CRC’s policy 
reports. With this in mind, there is little doubt that the CRC’s focus on the problem of abandoned 
property and tax foreclosure reform catalyzed the passage of Michigan’s Public Act 123. In the framing 
of policy streams and production, CRC at once plays the roles of academic, researcher, and consultant; as 
it did in its feedback on the state legislature’s tax foreclosure reform (Kingdon, 1984). Moreover, in the 
development of land banking, the release of CRC’s report can indeed be considered as the primary 
focusing event which drew attention and set the field for land banking and Public Act 123, even if the 
report itself made no specific mention of land banking as a policy innovation. 
 
During this same period, Genesee County Treasurer Dan Kildee was directly confronting the detrimental 
effects of property abandonment, particularly in his native hometown of Flint. As treasurer, Kildee was 
actively involved in tax foreclosure reform at the state level both during and after the CRC report was 
delivered (Thorne, 2014). The problems posed by abandoned property were especially palpable to Kildee, 
who in a 2014 interview admitted that by 1999, Michigan’s tax foreclosure system “had become a system 
that was really a bonanza for out-of-state speculators” (Thorne, 2014). Kildee’s involvement in the 
legislative process only buttressed a problem that state lawmakers could no longer gloss over. The 
passage of PA 123 in 2000 and the enabling of tax foreclosure laws which could more quickly and 
efficiently transfer tax-delinquent property into public ownership, however, was only the beginning of a 
new problem for Kildee; how to “do a better job of finding uses for the properties that go through [the tax 
foreclosure] process” (Thorne, 2014). 
 
The Policy 
 
Dan Kildee was a known political figure in Flint, having served on the Genesee County Board of 
Commissioners since 1984 and enduring an unsuccessful campaign for Flint’s mayoralty in 1991. 
Determined to find a solution to the ‘new’ problem of how to handle land that had already passed through 
the foreclosure process and into public ownership, Kildee soon discovered the paucity of policy research 
on the topic and successful examples of policy implementation. While land banks existed in Missouri, 
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Ohio, Kentucky, and Georgia, the successes of these land banks had been appreciably inconclusive. 
Moreover, as Kildee put it simply, “I was able to find some people who were doing research on this, and I 
went to the Brookings Institution in Washington and immediately discovered that nobody was doing it 
right in the country” (Thorne, 2014). Though top think tanks had yet to seize upon land banking as a 
policy innovation, the work of one Atlanta-based academic researcher came to the attention of Kildee, 
setting in motion what in 2002 materialized as the Genesee County Land Reutilization Council (LRC). 
 
Arguably the most prolific policy expert on land banking in the U.S., Professor Frank Alexander of the 
Emory University School of Law had been involved with tax foreclosure reform policy since the early 
1990s, during which time Alexander also contributed to the creation of the Fulton County / Atlanta Land 
Bank (Alexander, 2000). Alexander was well-versed in the issue of tax foreclosure reform and the 
repurposing of public assets for revitalization from the context of real property law, which had long been 
the main field of land banking policy discourse. While Dan Kildee was gearing up to operationalize 
Michigan PA 123 for returning abandoned properties to productive (and revenue-generating) use, the 
Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) in 2000 published one of Alexander’s earlier studies on 
public-sector real estate management and disposition, Renewing Public Assets for Community 
Development. The report outlined many of the goals and approaches that would eventually become 
embodied by land banks nationwide, and arguably represented a turning point with the philanthropically-
funded and published national recognition of Alexander’s policy studies on tax foreclosure reform and 
public sector real estate management and disposition. 
 
Alexander’s research and demonstrated involvement in land banking policy was the standout in the public 
sector real estate policy community that Kildee sought. While policy communities are often diverse, with 
many actors and more proposals, in this case the policy field was decisively narrow. It should be noted 
that for his part, Alexander’s policy recommendations drew in large part from the recombination of 
elements from prior policy. Still, with Alexander’s assistance, Treasurer Dan Kildee’s office spearheaded 
the Genesee County LRC in 2002, marking one of the most significant successes for Alexander’s career 
as a policy entrepreneur – and the start of Kildee’s. In the logic of John Kingdon, the defining 
characteristic of the policy entrepreneur is a “willingness to invest… resources – time, energy, reputation, 
and sometimes money – in the hope of a future return” (Kingdon, 1984). Whether accurate to the Genesee 
County project or not, Kingdon’s discussion on the motivations for advocacy of policy alternatives may 
be considered nevertheless. Kingdon classifies three general sources of advocacy motivation: the 
promotion of personal interests, the promotion of values in affecting the shape of public policy, and the 
phenomenon of “policy groupies” engaging in policy advocacy just for the fulfillment (Kingdon, 1984). 
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Alexander would go on to assume considerable influence in promoting policy reform and all the values it 
embodied in Genesee County as a guide to other municipalities, with a tremendous subsequent expansion 
of his influence on land banking projects well beyond Genesee County. Kildee would enjoy similar 
success emerging from the Genesee County LRC. By the late 2000s, in addition to serving as Genesee 
County Treasurer, Kildee became a key adviser to the Obama administration HUD’s Neighborhood 
Stabilization Program (NSP), a frequent speaker at conferences in the philanthropic and public sector real 
estate policy community. In 2004, Kildee transcended his public sector role into policy entrepreneurship 
by founding the Genesee Institute, a policy think tank affiliated with the Genesee County Land Bank 
providing technical assistance to jurisdictions interested in establishing their own land banks. In 2009, 
Alexander and Kildee would both co-found the Center for Community Progress (CCP), which has since 
become the nation’s self-proclaimed leading resource for communities seeking to address community 
revitalization. While Alexander still serves as a senior adviser for CCP, Kildee pivoted from CCP in 2012 
to fill his uncle’s former role as the U.S. Representative for Michigan's 5th congressional district. 
 
The Politics 
 
Frank Alexander’s policy recommendations in the early 2000s were not groundbreaking, cribbing from 
the past experiences of other land banking policy experiments, yet they found a highly receptive audience 
in Genesee County. This audience animated the policy beyond its prior extent, as prior to Genesee County 
land banking was a fringe topic – perhaps even one “intellectually boring” (Kingdon, 1984) – but it was 
also one with identifiable precedent. Another notable feature that Alexander’s policy recommendations 
had in their favor was that there were few arguments against them to be made, whether due to the 
inchoate nature of the policy or the fact that the policy proposals were not left wanting for perceived 
merits. The successful collaboration of Genesee County and the State of Michigan at a time when the iron 
of tax foreclosure reform had yet to cool ensured that the state government was sufficiently attuned to and 
“softened up” for further policy expansion, with the state passage of the Michigan Land Bank Fast Track 
Act in 2004 enabling the establishment of independent land bank authorities at state, county, and local 
levels. In turn, Michigan’s embrace of land banking combined with Kildee and Alexander’s advocacy and 
subsequent reporting on the advancement of land banking in Flint provided a case study of success that 
could be parlayed into adoption by other political bodies, including at the federal level. 
 
Beyond local and state politics, philanthropies, think tanks, and urban advocacy groups were also 
receptive to the potential of foreclosure reform, land banking, and the establishment of local land banks. 
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Policy entrepreneurs with ties from Michigan to D.C. also embraced land banking as a progressive 
approach to tackling some of the otherwise intractable issues facing disinvested areas, given the value 
acceptability of reinvesting in those communities hardest hit by postwar land use and lending policies, 
and deindustrialization. Land banking dovetailed well with the sustainability and equity-focused urban 
paradigms of intervention espoused by advocacy groups and philanthropies alike. Philanthropic 
organizations with Michigan ties, D.C.-based policy think tanks and nascent advocacy groups including 
the Brookings Institution and Smart Growth America provided both operational and financial support for 
the projects undertaken by Dan Kildee’s LRC and Genesee Institute (Kildee, 2002). The LRC and its 
subsequent reformation as the Genesee County Land Bank in 2004 became a feather in the cap of the 
largely like-minded organizations which contributed to its success. Why this policy moment did not occur 
with any prior land banks may also largely be attributed to the optimal conditions for the policy to take 
hold in Michigan. It stands to reason that the newly-established Democratic governorship of Jennifer 
Granholm in 2003 also provided a turnover moment during which the new Governor sought mission-
aligned policy fixes with technical feasibility and potential for quantifiable success. 
 
In the parlance of John Kingdon, the convergence of problem, policy, and political streams led to the 
“policy window” through which land banking in Michigan came into being (Kingdon, 1984) and grew 
into a national state of the art. Land banking’s post-Genesee County policy success and diffusion have 
further exhibited a snowball effect as more and more organizations and policy experts within the public 
and private sectors have piled on the bandwagon, particularly following the mortgage foreclosure crisis 
during the late 2000s. In summary, the Genesee County Land Bank’s origin story corroborates Kingdon’s 
policy streams model far more than challenges it. What was more unique to the Genesee County project, 
and may not have been explored in great detail by Kingdon, was the small size and narrow focus of the 
land banking policy community. Land banking developed from an incestuously consistent policy 
community; and if there were any opponents to or fragmentation within land banking at the turn of the 
21st century, they were surely not publicized. While land banking’s policy success may be attributable to 
the political climate of the day (with the Genesee County LRA’s Democratic pioneers finding support in 
both the new Democratic administrations of Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm and U.S. President 
Barack Obama), land banking has also developed as an apolitical or party-neutral policy solution that 
conveniently falls squarely within the third-way spectrum. Perhaps just as importantly, the innocuous 
framing of land banking as a progressive policy that could be embraced by leaders of ailing communities 
nationwide could not – and indeed has not – been substantively challenged. 
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Mobility and Mutability 
 
Land banking in Michigan’s origin story and the policy lessons it offers suggest in part how the Genesee 
County model realized its breakaway success on a national level. In larger part, the applicability and 
mutability of the land banking model pieced together by Frank Alexander and effectuated by Dan Kildee 
have contributed to its subsequent level of diffusion. Approaching land banking and land banks, then, 
though policy mutation and mobility offers still other lessons from the field. Jamie Peck and Nik 
Theodore have used Latin American social programming and budgetary policy to illustrate “fast policies”, 
which due to both exogenous and endogenous factors witness rapid diffusion and co-optation (Peck & 
Theodore, 2015). While the land banking policy here discussed is still for the most part local to certain 
regions of the U.S., there are surely some applications of Peck and Theodore’s policy mobility research. 
Peck and Theodore attribute the phenomenon of fast policy to, among other features, the performance of 
pragmatism, the manufacture of demonstration effects, experimentalism within narrow parameters, and a 
social complex of policy advocates, experts, and entrepreneurs (Peck & Theodore, 2015), and each of 
these can apply to land banking’s rapid policy diffusion. 
 
Land Banking: A ‘Fast Policy’? 
 
Genesee County’s establishment of a working template has been condensed and replicated as a how-to 
guide for other localities; this is precisely what Frank Alexander intended to create in 2005’s Land Bank 
Authorities: A Guide for the Creation and Operation of Local Land Banks. Between Alexander’s policy 
how-tos and Dan Kildee’s well-publicized touting of the Genesee County LRA and Land Bank’s 
quantifiable successes, word spread quickly of the successful policy model with demonstrated results to 
back it up. In comparison to previous land banking models, the new model was demonstrably more 
effective, readily packaged as a policy toolkit, and quickly became adopted as a best practice by the 
private, public, nonprofit, and philanthropic sectors alike. The Genesee County model also did not 
represent a radical departure from the established precedent of prior land banking case studies, which 
meant that the model could be applicable in a number of states without substantive changes to financial, 
institutional, and ideological parameters; and given that any number of local governments could move to 
create land banks, there was a sizeable market for the policy. Finally, the social complex of urban policy 
groups, philanthropies, and urban policy reform advocates that banded together around land banking as a 
policy fix grounded in community-based neighborhood revitalization endowed the policy with a 
consistent and multifaceted support network for policy diffusion and localized implementation. 
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Lessons in Intrinsic and Extrinsic Mutability 
 
The diffusion of land banking can be examined on the terms of its mutability as a policy. The mutability – 
or susceptibility to mutation – of land banking may be categorized by two main aspects; intrinsic and 
extrinsic (Peck & Theodore, 2015). Intrinsic mutability refers to the limited conditionality in policy 
application on account of key features necessary to secure intended outcomes. Land banks necessitate a 
handful of key features; foreclosure reform, the legal enabling of dedicated units to control surplus land, a 
pathway for property acquisition, and a funding strategy. From there on, land banks as a policy may be 
more DIY-friendly than they seem at first blush. What land banks are beyond these features is up to the 
state and local governments complicit in their creation. One of the reasons that the Genesee model 
endures such mythical status is the broad power Michigan bestowed upon land banks from the beginning, 
in its extensive foreclosure reforms of the late 1990s and expert-crafted land bank enabling act. Other 
states’ land banks may operate in more limited contexts on account of which land bank features they are 
able to incorporate. Extrinsic mutability refers to the outside pressures shaping the policy’s adoption; 
these may be sensitive to local context, as New York City’s proposal for a land bank appears to be in its 
focus on affordable housing (NYC Office of the Comptroller, 2016). However, the basic Alexander / 
Kildee model of land banking from Genesee County features a high modular integrity in its need for 
specific policy and procedural components in tax foreclosure law and organizational capacity in order to 
ensure the policy’s workability. This makes the basic land banking model, as effectively trademarked by 
Alexander and Kildee, less prone to mutation, except by those policy experts who were its key architects, 
innovators, or esteemed bandwagoneers. There is not a great deal of wiggle room for policy applications 
of land banking across different governments or levels of government, and while slight mutations have 
been spun off by local municipalities, the foundational model itself has not been substantively altered. 
 
Land banking was very nearly conceived as a refined model, palatable to the market-centric and 
entrepreneurial governing paradigms of U.S. municipalities in the post-Keynesian era as much as it was 
and remains palatable to the ideals of social equity interest and advocacy groups outside of the public 
sector. This latter point speaks to the extrinsic mutability of land banking, which is dependent on policy 
networks and periodic relevance of land banking as a policy. Born from problem identification in 
declining municipalities and catalyzed by the foreclosure crisis, land banking was a hot topic in the policy 
communities and advocacy groups throughout the 2000s and beyond. Lank banking’s policy diffusion 
may have slowed somewhat since then, but continues regardless. However, emerging and continued 
growing pains and struggles faced by many older and newer U.S. land banks alike portend less fresh-
faced enthusiasm moving forward. 
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The land banking model emerging from Genesee County’s policy experimentation in the early 2000s 
clearly exhibits many of the lessons in policy formation, adoption, and mobility in both its origin story 
and subsequent trajectory across jurisdictions and urban policy networks. From the streams of problems, 
policy, and politics that conspired to create the ideal conditions for land banking’s implementation in 
Genesee County and then by the State of Michigan, to the intrinsic and extrinsic qualities of land banking 
policy devised by Frank Alexander and carried forth by outside advocacy groups and policy think tanks. 
The culmination of Alexander and Kildee’s policy entrepreneurialism in the 2009 establishment of the 
Center for Community Progress has only reinforced land banking as a best practice, replete with a well-
defined policy toolkit, established policy community, and a growing number of case studies. The 
variegated policy outcomes of land banks, on the other hand, are another question. While most of the 
post-Genesee County land banks may have been created more or less equal, their local implementations 
offer still other valuable lessons on mutations in the day-to-day application of policy. 
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Chapter 4: Actually Existing Land Banking 
Creatures of Entrepreneurialism 
 
The phenomenon of an entrepreneurial, quasi-private land bank concerned with ensuring its quantitative 
success at the potential expense of more qualitative and thematic concerns is nothing new. Since the 
1970s, policy briefs on land banking advanced an approach to urban regeneration that largely embraced 
narratives of creative destruction and displacement (Hemann, 1978). Land banking largely gained 
popularity during the 2000s on account of its potential to turn prevailing narratives of displacement and 
inequity in urban development on their heads. This begs the question of whether or not land banking has 
lived up to the expectations of its various promoters, as well as how to go about evaluating the 
effectiveness of land banking policies. An overview of the context-dependent utility of and potential for 
land banks may suggest some means of evaluating policy outcomes, though this risks defaulting to 
standard performance metrics (e.g. abandoned properties restored to tax rolls, structured rehabilitated and 
occupied, revenue generated, et.al.) utilized in the field. Yet quantitative performance metrics only reveal 
so much; and to more substantively evaluate the policy outcomes, examining land banking’s supporters, 
policy goals, and general post-implementation praxis offers a window into evaluating the promises made 
– and promises kept – by land banking. 
 
Land Banking in Context 
 
Property abandonment and the accumulation of publicly-owned surplus land presents a threat to operating 
revenues and funding sources and an opportunity to modify future development outcomes by leveraging 
fixed public assets. Municipal bodies utilize land use controls, public incentives, and public-owned 
property to influence development outcomes, with strategies employed often targeting local economic 
growth. The outcomes of growth-oriented development strategies depend on the local market, which 
informs the public sector’s appetite for growth. While some cities are desperate for growth by any means 
necessary, other cities can afford to grapple with the side effects of too much growth and spinoff 
inequities. Public ownership of real estate is the most direct means of controlling development outcomes; 
similarly, markets have dictated what cities can do with their surplus land in the absence of increased 
public financial support. Cities with active or high-value real estate development markets can leverage 
their real estate assets far more effectively than cities with depressed markets. In many post-industrial 
legacy cities, development is often inhibited by complete private and institutional investment disinterest 
in the real estate market. Yet even in those legacy cities, the utility of public ownership may increase 
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dramatically in the event and at the time that local or sub-local markets experience an uptick in 
investment activity. Given the limited resources typically available to public land banks and the 
importance of self-generated revenue in their funding structures, land banks must often turn to the local 
market to inform disposition strategies which may change across spatial and temporal context. 
 
Quantifying Land Banks 
 
Land bank disposition strategies have long been evaluated in terms of acquisition and disposition activity, 
revenues generated, property tax recaptured, and vacant properties occupied (Hemann, 1978; Kildee, 
2003). Land banks also work toward self-sustainability by design, necessitating the justification of their 
existence with results and engaging in triage in order to achieve those results. Land banks therefore create 
and report their own success to ensure continued operation. A land bank may be considered successful if 
it returns property to “productive use” (Alexander, 2000; Brooks, Collins, et. al., 2004), which may mean 
a multitude of different things in different contexts, but commonly refers to the disposition, activation, or 
reuse of abandoned land for some revenue-generating or public-benefit purpose. The inherent malleability 
of what a productive use is renders it a topic not feasible for this discussion on evaluating land banking 
outcomes, though the key takeaway is that land banks are evaluated through self-devised performance 
metrics. Evaluating individual land banks or land banking policy on the basis of inventory size, properties 
sold, homes occupied, or any number of common performance metrics would thus be hollow, given that 
they have been created by the policy designers themselves and are already in place. Other quantitative 
studies may delve into unexplored metrics, such as secondary or indirect effects of land bank activity (e.g. 
increasing property values, resident displacement, crime reduction, changing homebuyer or community 
demographic profiles, etc.). For the purpose of this thesis, rather than quantifying land banks, a more 
general qualitative evaluation of policy outcomes skirts the complexity of local nuance and questions 
what promises land banking held for whom, and if they have been kept. 
 
Land Banking Interest Groups and Beneficiaries 
 
More often than not, land banks operate in disinvested and heavily-abandoned urban areas. Development 
and investment interest in these areas is scarce, and public sectors tend to jump at opportunities for 
economic growth at the risk of socially regressive outcomes. As a function of quasi-public governance, 
land banks by default encourage property redevelopment and revalorization. To bank on economic 
growth, land banks operate akin to private business entities analyzing where to deploy limited resources 
for maximum return. Best-practice land bank policy studies have championed corporate organizational 
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structures (Fitzpatrick, 2009), divorce from standard bureaucratic operating procedures and accountability 
(Dewar, 2015), and the deployment of market-rate short-turnover disposition strategies in focus areas 
(Alexander, 2015). Most land banks have come to employ these recommendations; not the least due to the 
fact that most land banks have adopted similar policy models. With land banks’ refashioning of public-
sector management and disposition strategies into a more entrepreneurial and quasi-public / quasi-private 
form, there are benefits and drawbacks to different individual and institutional groups. Business and 
development interests may benefit from the presence of an intermediary organization to bypass what may 
otherwise be protracted public approval processes and bureaucratic procedures. These interests most 
certainly benefit from the streamlining of disposition processes and the legal preparation and packaging of 
properties for disposition that land banks undertake. Local governments may lose out on direct oversight 
of disposition and development strategies, and benefit from a scapegoat. A summary of land banking’s 
potential interest groups is provided in Table 1, on the following page. 
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Interest Group Reason for Interest Positive Outcome Negative Outcome 
Public Sector / Local 
Government 
Abandoned land seen 
as both opportunity 
and threat; land banks 
focus on the former 
 
Acquisition and 
disposition processes 
are stymied by rigid 
procedural statutes, 
drawing out period of 
abandonment 
 
Dedicated unit for 
public real estate 
shifts responsibility 
for management and 
disposition outside 
local government 
 
Land banks stimulate 
real estate investment 
and development in 
target areas 
 
The removal of public 
sector procedural 
mechanisms 
accelerate the 
transition of land to 
revenue use 
 
Land banks add layer 
of accountability and 
defense, assume cost 
and administrative  
burdens from local 
government 
Development activity 
stimulated may lead 
to rapid appreciation, 
resident displacement 
 
Public oversight is 
marginalized; control 
over public land 
disposition strategy is 
lost and decisions are 
less transparent 
 
Land banks grow in 
influence, government 
remains accountable 
for land bank activity, 
struggling land banks 
become a burden 
Private Sector / 
Local Business / 
Real Estate 
Intermediary 
organizations allow 
easier access to public 
real estate without 
bureaucratic and legal 
obstacles 
 
Land banks’ market-
oriented disposition 
goals and strategies 
are mission-aligned 
with private sector 
 
Land banks move 
property quickly, with 
limited public review, 
and can erase tax liens 
or other encumbrance 
on property sold 
 
Land banks’ public 
sector connections 
facilitate P3 to unlock 
or leverage resources 
for development 
 
Property speculation 
curbed by land bank 
intervention in tax 
foreclosure sales and 
public real estate 
disposition 
 
Control over land 
disposition weeds out 
buyers and proposals 
misaligned with stated 
public goals 
Nonprofit Sector / 
CDCs 
Land banks provide a 
supportive point 
source for local land 
assembly efforts and 
strategic development 
programming 
 
Land banks develop 
connections with local 
CDCs often giving 
preference or priority 
to CDC dispositions 
and proposals 
 
Land banks may give 
preferential treatment 
to for-profit groups in 
instances where short-
turnover strategies are 
deployed 
Individuals / 
Homeowners 
Land banks stem 
disinvestment and 
abandonment and 
facilitate affordable 
homeownership 
 
Land banks abate 
nuisance properties 
and resell homes at 
bargain prices for 
owner occupants 
Selective disposition 
strategies may shut 
locals out of their 
markets or contribute 
to displacement 
TABLE 1: INTERESTS AND OUTCOMES IN LAND BANKING 
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Though the table is by no means exhaustive, it provides a basic overview of the potential benefits and 
threats posed by land banks to a variety of interest groups. One interest group that is not referenced in the 
table is the policymakers and policy networks themselves; their concern is primarily that their policies are 
adopted. Documented land bank successes quantified and published in countless activity reports and press 
releases and the continuing adoption of land banking policies largely insulate the architects of land 
banking’s policy model from critiques or repercussions of their models as applied in various locations. 
The architects of land banking policy have done well to ensure that they have covered all the necessary 
bases. Professor Frank Alexander’s most recent guide to land banks provides a well-informed and 
appreciably objective assessment of challenges land banks must often overcome and potential 
management and disposition strategies, though acknowledges “the unintended consequences of success” 
that may arise from exclusionary development and residential displacement (Alexander, 2015). Alexander 
cautiously does not suggest that such socially regressive outcomes are a fait accompli, but are dependent 
on local government objectives and disposition strategies. As a point of departure, the very 
acknowledgement that land banks can lead to inequitable development outcomes belies much of the 
enthusiasm that surrounded and enabled land banking’s policy diffusion in the first place. 
 
Promises Made 
 
The 2007 National Vacant Properties Campaign conference revolved around ethics, values, and practical 
solutions to the issues posed by vacancy and abandonment in declining urban areas. The event attracted 
some of the most prominent names in land use policy circles, with high-level representatives from Smart 
Growth America, the Ford Foundation, and the Surdna Foundation among others engaging in dialogue on 
the deleterious qualities of vacant property. In a loaded speech on community responsibility for vacant 
properties, director of the Sustainable Community Development Group Deeohn Ferris stated that “there 
are places around the nation where land use, zoning, disinvestments, and other policies gave rise to vacant 
properties, and we are really talking about rebuilding our communities” (Schamess, 2007). Ferris was 
among others equating vacant property issues to environmental justice, adding that “I am going to use the 
dreaded R word [race] and the dreaded C word” [class]. Ford Foundation’s George McCarthy offered that 
abandoned property issues were “on the boundary of two competing and powerful cultural norms or 
values: concerns for private property rights and the role of the public sector to reinforce and even force 
whatever it takes for the public good”, and that solutions to vacant property issues can “unite both 
interests under the same tent” (Schamess, 2007). Land banking was accepted (if not promoted by the 
event’s co-sponsors) as a step in the right direction; a third-way solution to presumably support social 
justice through real estate market intervention. The takeaways herein illustrate two important themes in 
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land banking’s assisted diffusion at the hands of think tanks and philanthropies; the immutability of the 
“public good”, and the demonization of abandonment as a social injustice. 
 
It stands to reason that the land banking model’s prescriptions of public intervention in real estate markets 
and potential for community-oriented development would be an ideal policy fix. An unjust legacy of 
government-assisted exclusion, disinvestment, and abandonment could be ameliorated by community 
development and the re-appropriation of vacant land for restorative purposes. The optimism surrounding 
land banking suggests that there was a genuine belief that historical trends of public and private sector 
abuses could be upended by this intervention mechanism to serve the “public good” via development or 
redevelopment policy. The Genesee land bank model’s early proponents focused on questions of equity 
and inclusion; and at least in theory, land banks’ seemingly universal appeal could at once revitalize 
communities with new economic activity, increase residents’ quality of life, and influence markets to 
achieve otherwise unobtainable development results within communities. Dan Kildee himself claimed in 
an early policy brief that by “using the legal tools a land bank provides, a community can ensure that tax-
foreclosed property is sold or developed with the long-term interest of the community and surrounding 
property owners in mind” (Kildee, 2003). Land banks could thus be a mediator of real estate markets, and 
a savior from market failures; all while promoting a message of public good and inclusivity. The more 
pragmatic side of land banking is just as keen on land banking for its revalorization potential, though who 
this return-oriented behavior ultimately benefits, and who it may exclude, is not as clear. 
 
Soon after the Michigan Land Bank Fast Tract Act was adopted in 2004, a team of researchers from the 
Taubman College of Architecture & Urban Planning released a policy study entitled “Harnessing 
Community Assets: A Detroit Land Bank Authority”, laying the framework for a land bank that would 
“return property back to the tax rolls… [and] be a catalyst to foster quality developments that will be 
long-term community assets” (Brooks, Collins, et. al., 2004). The DLBA policy study provides both a 
textbook example of a land bank proposal (its contributors included Margaret Dewar, Frank Alexander, 
and Daniel Kildee), and offers a suggestion of the theoretical and practical promises land banks could 
fulfill in implementation. In the Taubman report, the DLBA would require initial allocations from CDBG 
and philanthropic sources, that all P&DD-owned properties would be transferred to the DLBA within 5 
years, and that DLBA would acquire properties on the basis of generating operating resources for the land 
bank; with regard to disposition, DLBA would sell properties at nominal prices (e.g. $1.00 side lots). The 
report also upheld the need for transparency in disposition practices; including the provision of 
descriptive letters of rejection for those not allowed to purchase a property, and the opportunity for 
rejected applicants to appeal rejections “to prevent arbitrary decisions” (Brooks, Collins, et. al., 2004). 
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For buildable lots, there was a stipulation that each lot sold would necessitate a development agreement 
(with development completed within 18 months). The ideal land bank, then, would be self-sustaining 
(though require initial outside support from reliable sources), geared towards physical redevelopment, 
incentivize purchases through low prices, and all the while maintain a sufficient level of transparency to 
the public and local government. 
 
Promises Kept? 
 
While land banks have been embraced and promoted by policy entrepreneurs and think tanks alike with 
inclusionary, community-oriented development in mind, land banks also have the authority to select clear 
winners and losers within (or without) the communities in which they operate. Emerging during a period 
of declining federal resources available to municipalities in general, and with a case to prove, some 
degree of entrepreneurial bootstrapping is necessary for local land banks’ continued operation, success, 
and expansion. In order to bolster chances for realizing quantifiable positive program results, many land 
banks were quick to establish strategic partnerships with local community development corporations 
(Hemann, 1978; Kildee, 2003) and often selectively reserve land for larger development projects with 
transformative potential impacts (Spalding and Duda, 2011). The very nature of land banking involves 
some form of speculation on the side of a public sector empowered to maintain the non-use of land for an 
indefinite period of time. The predication on which land banks’ success hinges is that eventually, time and 
conditions may arise such that the land is revalorized, and banked land can be leveraged or reused to 
stimulate new development. 
 
In her research, Rachel Weber has explored the local state’s refashioning to resemble the private sector 
with emphasis on entrepreneurialism and supplying conditions for extracting value from disinvested land 
(Weber, 2002). The U.S. public sector at large has played an increasingly entrepreneurial role in recent 
decades. While public sectors in high-Keynesian fashion focused on providing services and support for 
their residents, the entrepreneurial public sector is more concerned with pursuing economic growth than 
looking after its own. Real estate management and disposition strategies provide a window into the 
bigger-picture trends, themes, and discussions of shrinkage and the measures undertaken to address it. An 
approach that is rent-seeking and revenue-maximizing furthers a growth-oriented and post-Keynesian 
approach in seeking spatial fixes to the continued outflow of residents and businesses and economic 
stagnation (Molotch, 1976; Hackworth, 2007); yet growth-oriented approaches do not always bode well 
for concerns of equity and inclusivity. The Great Society programs of the 1960s represented the last 
chapter in a decades-long pattern of substantial federal support for urban programs aimed at promoting (if 
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at times misguidedly) more equitable development within urban areas. As declining profitability of 
American industry and increasing costs of federal programs became more evident, calls for a wholesale 
contraction of government (and particularly federal government) became manifest through the 
comparatively shrunken and decentralized “New Federalist” paradigm promoted and operationalized from 
the Nixon presidential administration onward. Declining support from the federal government for urban 
areas in particular has been well-documented in its effect on local housing and economic development 
strategies (Sutton, 2008). The idea of an “entrepreneurial” municipal government refers to the 
subsequently increasing reliance by municipal governments on private investment. Many cities have 
focused on attracting private development through incentivization and public-private partnerships 
(Hackworth, 2007). In this realm, competition for private investment, housing policy, and surplus 
municipal real property are often closely related in practice. 
 
Land banks in particular have had to embrace a heightened entrepreneurialism out of sheer necessity. 
While financial support for local land banking activities from federal, state, and local government sources 
along with philanthropy and institutional policy groups has increased over the past two decades in light of 
demonstrated successes, some land banks continue to struggle against slack outside financial support 
(whether due to unsatisfactory results or the perceived return risk of relatively uncharted local policy 
territory), and inchoate self-funding mechanisms. In Flint, the GCLB benefited from private philanthropic 
support to gain momentum, and went on to establish a robust self-funding mechanism through revenues 
from county tax lien and land bank property sales (Dubb, 2009). Land banks tend to succeed when there 
is either a strong market demand for some (if not most or all) of its holdings, or strong financial and 
programming support from outside partners. The oldest land bank in existence, the St. Louis LRA, has 
not been quite as fortunate; as of 2018, the 47-year-old LRA continues to struggle with budgetary 
shortfalls and an inability to fund even basic maintenance of its 12,000 properties (Bott and Barker, 
2018). St. Louis is not alone; many cities with land banks contain blocks upon blocks of derelict 
unwanted properties and attractive nuisances owned by land banks, with few prospects for the necessary 
funding to improve or maintain owned properties. Land banks are often caught between advancing the 
elusive public good and ensuring their own futures. It is worth taking stock of the fervor that surrounded 
land banks in the 2000s and question what expectations they have fulfilled. 
 
Land banks have spread quickly across localities that have endured real estate market failures and general 
capital crises. When these conditions become systemic, a period of regulatory experimentation ensues, 
generally entailing reworking existing institutional landscapes to deploy new regulatory frameworks. 
While the concept of “neoliberalism” is bandied about in urban studies with reckless abandon, themes of 
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neoliberalism certainly apply in the narrative arc of property abandonment and the subsequent formation 
of land banks. Rather than attempt to define the neoliberalization of urban governance, in land disposition 
and management it may suffice to highlight subsidiary features of “actually existing neoliberalism” in 
urban governance (Brenner and Theodore, 2005). According to Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, the 
regulatory strategies of neoliberal praxis may include implementing modernizing projects that embrace 
government-led economic revitalization, renegotiating social arrangements, and imposing market 
discipline on aspects of everyday life (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). The concept of “actually existing 
neoliberalism” refers not to neoliberal ideology itself, but rather the path-dependent manifestations of 
market-serving neoliberal policies working through embedded institutional and regulatory frameworks. 
While land banks may appear to introduce a novel regulatory framework for the management and 
disposition of publicly-owned real estate assets, in practice they may be little more than a continuation of 
the forces of capital accumulation and creative destruction that in some cases led to their very need. 
 
One of the hallmarks of neoliberal urban governance has been creative destruction; the fluid disposal of 
and refashioning of capital-accumulating activity that has rendered countless winners and losers across 
time and space. Many legacy cities arrived at this classification on account of such practices, as post-
Fordist, post-Keynesian policies eviscerated economic bases and stripped cities of critical government 
support. The unstable geographies that resulted spelled doom for those municipalities that lost out and 
created the conditions of disinvestment and abandonment that informed the rallying cries for spatial 
policy fixes; the same cries echoed by land banking’s proponents. As a one such policy fix, land banks 
have been framed as a means of returning tax delinquent properties to revenue-generating use and 
restoring economic activity to moribund local or neighborhood development markets. As quasi-public 
entities designed to sidestep government processes and assume responsibility over land assets without the 
direct accountability and processes that accompany public sector management and disposition strategies, 
the implementation of land banks as a policy fix speaks to the shrinkage of government functions and the 
market-centric reformation of what remains. That land banks are market-serving is no secret; according to 
one 2009 report on land banking, “Generally, today’s land banks are not intended to replace the operation 
of private markets, but rather to assist where there is a failure of market conditions” (Fitzpatrick, 2009). 
 
The same forces of creative destruction that led to uneven patchworks of localized growth and decline 
(Hackworth, 2007; Beauregard, 2008) risk replication on account of land banks’ propensity for pursuing 
quantifiable successes to ensure their tenacity. While land banks have capacity to effectuate inclusionary, 
sustainable redevelopment of disinvested areas, disposition strategies that favor or entice capital 
accumulation may foster localized patchworks of investment and exclusion to the detriment of extant 
40 
 
communities, constituting a selective reconstruction of the built environment (Weber, 2002). Socially 
regressive outcomes such as displacement or the downsides of “success” in land banking intervention 
strategies moreover contribute to the imposition of market discipline on affordability and inclusion, and 
previously-existing social arrangements. It can be argued, then, that land banks are not only byproducts of 
actually existing neoliberalism (e.g. fiscal austerity, lean bureaucracies) and economic restructuring 
outcomes (i.e. post-Fordist, post-Keynesian decline contributing to the emergence of legacy cities); they 
tend to constitute an actually existing neoliberalism themselves. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
Chapter 5: Case Studies 
The Case Studies 
 
A critical evaluation of land banking’s on-the-ground activities through case studies offers some context 
to the otherwise largely positive narratives quantifying land banks’ successes over time that have been 
incorporated in most land bank program evaluations and policy studies thus far. Land bank activity 
reports have focused on quantitative metrics by which program objectives and results are compared; 
number of properties sold, amount of revenue generated, number of community partnerships, et cetera. 
Rarer is an evaluation of land banking praxis against the ideals which land banks were adopted by interest 
groups in the public, philanthropic, non-profit, and private sectors to work toward. The previous section 
dealt with land banking as an ideal versus land banking as manifest. It is fairly clear that many land banks 
must undertake an entrepreneurial approach to their operations by necessity; yet in what ways does this 
act to the detriment of equity and inclusion? This section goes into greater detail on land banking 
approaches as they are manifest in a few select geographic case studies, and what these case studies 
suggest regarding influence, motivations, local embeddedness, and equity outcomes of land banking. 
While an evaluation of case studies in this vein may offer some lessons of import to other localities (or to 
those case study localities themselves), the selection of case studies is appreciably limited and, par the 
course, context-dependent. 
 
The first case study entails Chicago, Illinois and the Cook County Land Bank Authority (CCLBA). 
CCLBA is a relative newcomer to land banking having been established in 2013, though it is by 
geographic expanse the largest land bank authority within the United States. The CCLBA also focuses in 
large part on the City of Chicago, a large and remarkably successful shrinking city. The rapid 
development changes and lingering socioeconomic disparities within Chicago make evaluating its public 
sector’s social impacts through development and programming all the more relevant, and beg the question 
of whether CCLBA is not simply a furtherance of the inequitable, exclusionary, and market-serving 
public sector development policies that have pervaded over several decades of Chicago governance. In a 
similar vein, Detroit is home to one of the country’s largest land banks by inventory at over 90,000 
properties. Detroit’s history is also pockmarked with government-assisted exclusion, the subjugation of 
individual property rights to appease business interests, and rapid changes in sub-local or neighborhood-
level real estate markets. Detroit is most noteworthy in that land banks have maintained a large presence 
in Detroit since the mid-2000s, as the 2004 Michigan Land Bank Fast Track Act was devised with Detroit 
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in mind. The Detroit Land Bank Authority (DLBA), Wayne County Land Bank (WCLB), and Michigan 
Land Bank (MLB) also operate within Detroit, meriting tangential discussions on each. 
Finally, one city has seemingly managed to succeed in leveraging its real estate to achieve economic 
development and housing goals in spite of its perennial lack of a land bank. New York City is provided as 
an ancillary study of non-land bank approaches. To avoid a selection bias of only examining places where 
land banking has “worked”, it may be equally if not more valuable to examine where the policy has not 
worked, went wrong, or otherwise met with resistance. Of course, New York is an inherently special city; 
comparing most U.S. cities to it, particularly legacy cities, may be something of a stretch. Yet there are 
some similarities; New York, like many other latecomers to the land banking policy arena, has been more 
or less effectively managing its publicly-owned real estate without the aid of a designated land bank. Yet 
even New York City has recently toyed with the idea of establishing its own land bank in light of the 
policy’s adoption at the state level, which illustrates the salability of land banking to administrations 
within and across quite different political economies.  
 
Case Study 1: CCLBA and Targeted Approaches (Chicago, IL) 
 
Unlike most land banks, which commonly rely on state enabling statutes to be established, Cook County 
leveraged its unique home rule authority in Illinois to establish the Cook County Land Bank Authority 
(CCLBA) in 2013. The need for a Cook County Land Bank became evident to Cook County 
Commissioner Bridget Gainer in the aftermath of the 2008 national foreclosure crisis, whose effects were 
exacerbated in lower-income communities. Households on Chicago’s south and west sides in particular 
were being displaced at a rapid clip, with each foreclosure contributing to a growing and increasingly 
visible abandonment of neighborhoods. Commissioner Gainer was initially at a loss for solutions, until 
reading about the Genesee County Land Bank in 2010 (Datcher, 2018). Enlisting the aid of an 
undisclosed collaborator on the GCLBA, and borrowing heavily from Frank Alexander’s land bank 
model, CCLBA was designed and established in the mold of many counterparts. CCLBA’s proponents 
included Gainer, Cook County Board President Toni Preckwinkle, and, perhaps notably for this thesis, 
Business and Professional People for the Public Interest (BPI), a local policy center advancing “the public 
interest against all inequities” founded by Midas Muffler Company CEO Gordon Sherman. BPI 
summarized the potential for land banking in Cook County in a 2013 press release: 
 
What will the Cook County Land Bank do? It will acquire vacant properties, make sure they are well-
maintained, and then work to return them to productive use. Properties can be used for everything 
from creating new community gardens to increasing affordable housing to spurring commercial 
development. Working strategically and in close collaboration with local governments and 
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community partners, the Land Bank will help stop the downward spiral decimating the hardest hit 
communities, sow the seeds of economic revitalization, and spur major redevelopment initiatives. 
(BPI, 2013).  
 
While CCLBA is a relative newcomer to the land banking policy arena, it is the nation’s largest land bank 
by geography, spanning all 1,635 square miles of Cook County. CCLBA’s properties are mostly acquired 
through Cook County’s tax foreclosure system via right of first refusal (ROFR) on foreclosed properties, 
which may be considered a targeted acquisition mechanism. Because of this, CCLBA itself determines 
the geographic extent and location of its intervention strategies. Most of CCLBA’s abandoned tax 
delinquent real properties are located within the City of Chicago (Weissman, 2015), an area of concerted 
attention for the CCLBA. CCLBA proactively “banks” inventory in otherwise weak-market areas 
exhibiting “positive housing market characteristics”; or where it may have the greatest potential to 
maximize revitalization given limited funding (CCLBA, 2015). CCLBA’s budgetary constraints all but 
require it to take calculated action in areas with potential for short-turnover and strong existing 
organizational networks; an approach to land management and disposition strategy that would not be out 
of place in the private sector. Entrepreneurial approaches to development such as these will inevitably 
favor certain communities over others. Moreover, any form of facilitating market rate development in a 
low-income area may in practice lead to positive outcomes for higher-income residents, new residents, 
and real estate development interests while lower-income current residents may witness displacement or 
quality of life deterioration as their costs of living increase. While it is certainly a stretch to say that 
CCLBA are purveyors of socially regressive outcomes, the end goal of CCLBA given its underlying 
profit motives in self-sustenance remain an open-ended question. 
 
As a quasi-public real estate owner, CCLBA’s management and disposition strategy arguably embodies 
an entrepreneurial bent. Rachel Weber has discussed the local state’s refashioning to resemble the private 
sector with an emphasis on supplying the conditions for extracting value from disinvested land (Weber, 
2002). With this in mind, it where is the public sector (in this case through land banking) able to extract 
value from its holdings, and how does it move to extract this value? With research assistance from the 
DePaul University Institute for Housing Studies, in 2015 CCLBA designated thirteen focus communities 
within Chicago in which it would “maximize revitalization efforts” by undertaking short-turnover asset 
disposition strategies (Figure 2). CCLBA’s decision making rationale is deconstructed in this case study 
to reveal how the intervention has been operationalized. In so doing, this case study also hints at emerging 
trends since CCLBA’s intervention in its focus communities; an attempt to re-assess CCLBA’s focus 
areas some years along in the implementation effort. 
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CCLBA in Chicago: Operationalization and Methods 
 
To evaluate CCLBA’s strategy in 
Chicago, deconstructing the data 
and metrics used in DePaul 
University’s research and 
CCLBA’s focus area selection 
process is a good place to start. 
CCLBA’s selection process 
considered a number of market 
activity indicators, including low-
value sales (i.e. home sales of less 
than $20,000), property turnover 
ratio, and foreclosure activity. 
Focus area selection is further 
refined under Illinois Housing 
Development Authority Blight 
Reduction Program guidelines. In 
this narrowing down, census 
tracts in weak-market community 
areas exhibiting “positive housing 
market characteristics” including 
increasing mortgage activity, and 
declining vacancy and foreclosure 
rates sourced from ACS 5-Year Estimates. Finally, communities with organizations that have expressed 
interest in working with CCLBA and higher concentrations of publicly-owned real property were refined 
out to formalize the 13 community focus areas. Since some years have elapsed since 2015, tracking the 
metrics employed by CCLBA since the selection of its focus areas may both corroborate the focus areas’ 
rationale and suggest how the areas have changed since 2015. The City of Chicago, like many others, has 
endured a history characterized in part by the marginalization of low-income, minority areas and their 
residents for the sake of facilitating development to attract higher-income residents (e.g. the HOPE VI 
treatment of public housing projects and refashioning of these sites as mixed-income communities). 
 
FIGURE 2: CCLBA FOCUS AREA MAP 
Image Source: Cook County Land Bank Authority 
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To its merit, CCLBA employs a progressive and relatively transparent approach to its strategy and 
disposition (the fact that its Focus Area selection criteria is publicly available is remarkable all on its own, 
and may be considered a good practice). Under the leadership of executive director Rob Rose, CCLBA’s 
disposition and development strategies prioritize disposition to local developers and aspiring developers 
of color, who tend to have deeper ties to and contextual knowledge of the areas of Chicago in which 
CCLBA operates (Abello, 2019). Yet with land banks facing a conundrum of revitalizing communities 
while performing triage by selecting areas of focus (as recommended by Frank Alexander’s policy 
model), interventions may not promote the equity and inclusion that ensure inclusionary redevelopment 
across the board. Indeed, the CCLBA embodies some approaches that may risk a perpetuation of unjust 
development outcomes with only tokenistic opportunities bestowed on non-target communities. 
 
The thirteen CCLBA Chicago focus areas designated in 2015 span 162 census tracts, located across the 
south and west sides of the city. For analysis, all CCLBA Focus Areas and Focus Area census tracts were 
pulled and evaluated at three separate points in time: 2010, 2015, and 2017. This allows for obtaining 
information on market conditions prior to CCLBA’s intervention, as well as both during and after 
CCLBA’s intervention in these communities. While the true effect of CCLBA’s programming or presence 
in these communities is yet unknown (and may well be negligible), the community contexts under which 
CCLBA is operating may suggest something about their business model. For comparison, select 
community area-level metrics were taken from DePaul University’s Institute for Housing Studies data 
portal to discern whether residents’ homeownership opportunities have increased both within and adjacent 
to CCLBA Focus Areas (Appendix A). Within the CCLBA Focus Areas, a more detailed approach was 
taken in approaching questions of revalorization and real estate speculation, operationalized as a function 
of housing costs, property values, abandonment, and local consumer affordability. 
 
Analysis: CCLBA Community Areas 
 
Comparative analysis between CCLBA Focus Areas and adjacent community areas seeks to better define 
the factors considered in determining Focus Areas, evaluate the factors on a community area basis, and do 
the same for CCLBA-adjacent community areas over time to determine whether the latter have remained 
at a disadvantage or if any spillover effects could be observed. Median values of the selected observations 
are compared both against each other and against median values for the entire City of Chicago. The first 
factor observed is the amount of foreclosure auction sales resulting in REO (“Real Estate Owned” or 
foreclosed / no sale properties). This indicator serves as a proxy for curtailed market interest; the higher 
the proportion of REO-resultant foreclosure sales, the lower the market interest. 
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Figure 3 illustrates that in general, 
foreclosure sales citywide result 
overwhelmingly in REO. Yet while 
REO-resultant sales have trended 
downward at the city level, they 
remain high in CCLBA focus and 
adjacent community areas, with only a 
slight edge manifest in adjacent areas 
as of the most recent data from 2017. 
 
One of the factors used by DePaul and CCLBA in determining focus areas was the prevalence of low-
value sales, defined as real estate transactions for less than $20,000. This measure also speaks to the 
market interest and activity within a given community area; the higher proportion of low-value sales, the 
lower the market interest and the lower potential for investment returns to justify market entry from a 
financial return perspective. In Figure 4, the decrease in low-value property sales suggests a trending 
revalorization at all levels from 2010 to 
2017. What is remarkable is that 
CCLBA-adjacent community areas 
have consistently exhibited the highest 
proportions of low-value sales, and 
continue to do so as of the most recent 
data. While the value delta between 
CCLBA and adjacent community areas 
appears to be narrowing, this indicator 
highlights how CCLBA left the lowest 
value potential communities out of its focus area selection. Given that CCLBA must make do with 
relatively limited and performance-based resources available to influence neighborhood revitalization, 
isolating the more promising community areas for investment is a no-brainer. Leveraging financial and 
institutional resources to spur the development momentum of focus areas appears to be a justifiable 
intervention based on the decreases in low-value sales, but begs the question of who actually benefits 
from these low-value sales. 
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Data Source: DePaul University Institute for Housing Studies 
Data Source: DePaul University Institute for Housing Studies 
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Homeownership is an opportunity for 
individuals and households alike to 
invest in their communities while 
building personal equity and 
garrisoning their ability to remain in 
place. This is the basis on which 
homeownership-assistance programs 
and organizations offering affordable 
homeownership options (e.g. Habitat 
for Humanity) have been established 
and continue to operate. Land banks have been heralded, particularly in their public-relations interfaces, 
as providing pathways to homeownership. CCLBA is no exception; as case in point, its Homebuyer 
Direct program is aimed at prospective homeowners with affordability in mind, and with the partnership 
of local banks and financial institutions to provide flexible home financing options that would not 
otherwise exist in the private lending market. However, looking at who is actually buying property across 
the selected community areas suggests that on the whole, individual and household buyers make up less 
of the buying pool in CCLBA Focus Areas. As Figure 5 illustrates, businesses have constituted a 
distinctly greater proportion of real estate sales in CCLBA Focus Areas than adjacent community areas 
and the citywide median. And while business-buyer sales are decreasing in CCLBA areas, and increasing 
in other areas (suggesting a possible trend toward normalization), the fact that CCLBA Focus Areas rely 
on such a relatively high concentration of business buyers does not bode well for the individuals and 
households having to compete with business interests. 
 
Finally, in determining how accessible 
homeownership is to the prospective 
non-business homebuyer, access to 
financing has been assumed as a 
function of home mortgages issued 
within the respective community 
areas. Although CCLBA provides a 
digital rolodex of lending partners 
from which prospective homebuyers 
can choose, the fact remains that mortgages in these areas remain difficult to come by. Figure 6 illustrates 
the number of annual mortgages issued per 100 area properties. The incidence of lending can be as much 
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as twice as high on the city-wide level, and local lending activity has also been comparatively volatile 
over time. The main takeaway is that whereas CCLBA Focus Areas have enjoyed rising mortgage activity 
rates since 2010, CCLBA-adjacent areas remain largely sidelined from the Chicago lending market. 
Consistent growth in lending activity within CCLBA Focus Areas has moreover not been reflected in the 
weak activity growth in adjacent areas; and while CCLBA Focus Areas have been steadily closing the gap 
with the City of Chicago as a whole, adjacent community areas have been dragging down the median, 
with lending activity still below 2010 levels. Without lending support, more non-business homebuyers in 
these areas may resort to cash sales, predatory land contracts, and fewer pathways to homeownership. 
 
Analysis: CCLBA Census Tracts 
 
On a more granular level, indicators were selected at the census tract level via ACS 5-Year estimates 
taken in 2010, 2015, and 2017 across 162 CCLBA Focus Area census tracts. The variables examined 
included median rent, median home value, other vacancy, and median household income. Median 
household income was selected as a variable in order to gauge whether increases in median rent and 
property values occurred commensurately with rising incomes. First, we can observe median rents and 
change over time within each neighborhood focus area in Figure 7. 
 
Most of the community areas have trended upward in median rent across census tracts, though not all. 
The data does not present a precipitous increase in median rent across any of the subject community 
areas, so it cannot be implied that these areas are undergoing transformational change in terms of rental 
affordability. Turning to median housing values next, curiously, home values are not increasing at nearly 
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the pace that rents are increasing. On the contrary, home values have trended downward since 2010, and 
in some communities have declined between 2015 and 2017, as shown in Figure 8 on the following page. 
 
Observing rents and home values alone does not speak to housing affordability; to this end, taking stock 
of household incomes over time may suggest whether housing costs are keeping in pace with household 
purchasing power. This data, in Figure 9, shows that household incomes are generally trending upwards, 
suggesting that at least in the case of escalating median rents, there seems to be a concomitant increase in 
household incomes. Whether this is due to existing residents seeing their own incomes increasing, or due 
to higher household incomes of incoming residents, is more difficult to ascertain and beyond the scope of 
this research. 
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In this research, a simple “rent speculation” indicator was calculated, taking stock of the incidence of 
median rent increases outpacing median household income increases from 2010-2015 and 2015-2017. In 
the event that rent growth outpaces income growth, it can be assumed that landlords are punching higher 
than the weight of the community, so to speak; not just seeking higher rents, but seeking higher rents 
either because they can or believe they can. Rent speculation was determined through a binary function of 
whether the percentage increase in rent was greater or less than the percentage increase in household 
income. The results of this analysis are represented in Figures 10 and 11, below: 
 
 
Rent growth outpacing household income growth occurred more frequently prior to the establishment of 
CCLBA’s Focus Areas. The narrowing of the mismatch between rental price and income increase may be 
considered one proxy for evaluating whether select areas are becoming more or less affordable, though 
approaching housing affordability in this manner is again admittedly an imperfect indicator. The reason 
this data is inconclusive is that it remains unknown whether increasing area median household incomes 
are rising as a result of in-migration of higher earners from other areas, or actual wage increases among 
the area’s existing residents. While the normalization of rent increases and income increases may suggest 
a trend toward housing affordability, it may conceal demographic shifts, and potential displacement. 
 
Conclusion and Further Research 
 
This analysis represents only an early and rudimentary effort in evaluating CCLBA intervention in select 
Chicago community areas. The analysis sought to reverse-engineer CCLBA’s focus area selection 
strategy and identify opportunities for further intervention. Intervention areas that may be improved upon 
include greater facilitation of individual or household buying activity through expansion of home 
financing options both within and, more importantly, outside the CCLBA Focus Areas. The data suggest 
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that CCLBA areas feature more business buyers and more institutional lending support, while still 
struggling with rent increases outpacing many residents’ wage growth. Benchmarking rent increases 
against the city-wide level may provide better context, while other indicators may reveal further change 
within these communities. However, the main takeaway from this analysis is that CCLBA, while well-
intentioned and employing progressive strategies of community-centric revitalization and transparency, 
serves as a catalyst for capital accumulation in the areas in which it is deployed. Increases in business 
buyers and the incidence of rent speculation in CCLBA focus areas anticipates concerns further down the 
line. Indeed, spinoff effects of CCLBA-assisted development projects are not accounted for wholesale, 
and the general approach taken by CCLBA and its proponents equates growth with good, with little if any 
evidence that planning for unintended consequences of success (e.g. gentrification and displacement) is 
occurring at this time. CCLBA may seek to ensure its tenacity through quantifiable successes, though it 
does not seek to (and is not necessarily intended to) ensure the outcomes of its successes will be 
universally positive. 
 
Case Study: Building Equity for Whom? (Detroit, MI) 
 
The Michigan Land Bank Fast Track Act of 2004 was designed with Detroit in mind, even if a Detroit-
based land bank authority would not materialize for years. At first, in-rem properties were assumed by the 
statewide Michigan Land Bank Fast Track Authority. The eventual creation of both the Wayne County 
Land Bank (WCLB) and Detroit Land Bank Authority (DLBA) created somewhat of a logistical 
boondoggle in Detroit, whose vacant property was theretofore managed almost exclusively by Detroit’s 
own Planning & Development Department (P&DD). The redundancy and confusion from having three or 
more land banks operating in one locality was largely ameliorated by the DLBA’s 2013 reorganization 
during Mayor Michael E. Duggan’s administration. Under Duggan’s administration, DLBA was given 
claim to the City of Detroit’s extensive portfolio of publicly-owned residential properties, granted 
authority to seize vacant properties from owners in the name of nuisance abatement, and given broad 
control over Detroit’s massive demolition program. Unlike CCLBA, both DLBA and WCLB acquire or 
have acquired the vast majority of their real estate inventory through passive receipt, as opposed to 
targeted acquisition. 
 
While the DLBA and WCLB are both discussed in this chapter, DLBA has been by far the more active of 
the two. When the DLBA was formally established in 2008, its influence was initially curtailed on 
account of skeptical members of bureaucracy and the reluctant cooperation of P&DD, which sought to 
continue its control and influence over city-owned real estate management, along with any revenues 
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received from the sale of city-owned property. At its inception, DLBA emphasized returning properties to 
productive reuse through a limited program of home rehabilitation, with a relatively miniscule portfolio of 
several hundred properties that has since swelled to tremendous proportions; as of 2018, the DLBA 
owned or controlled over 95,000 properties (Alvarez and Samuel, 2018). Most of the properties that enter 
DLBA ownership are those that do not sell in Wayne County’s annual tax foreclosure auction, making 
DLBA is the largest owner of last resort within Detroit. However, in pre-determined target development 
areas, DLBA may employ ROFR in order to acquire specific properties in advance of the auction for the 
cost of back taxes owed. In still other instances, DLBA may seize privately-owned vacant property or 
coerce property donations through its Nuisance Abatement Program. These latter methods illustrate how 
DLBA will add to its inventory via acquisition or active receipt in areas in which DLBA or the City of 
Detroit may have a predetermined development strategy. 
 
In its current form, DLBA offers a smorgasbord of disposition programs and works closely with City 
departments in shaping its disposition strategies. At the same time, DLBA maintains a degree of agency 
over these strategies, which differ pending neighborhood context. For example, in higher-value or 
appreciating areas, DLBA disposes of property via auction to the highest bidder. This strategy buoys local 
real estate markets and exchange values, as market-setting auction prices in appreciating neighborhoods 
levy upward pressure on real estate values. There is also some pragmatism in this strategy; DLBA will 
invest more resources in preparing homes for auction through home clean-outs, scheduled tours, and pre-
inspections, and seeks to recoup the investment (DLBA, 2019). In lower-value areas, DLBA will sell 
properties at low fixed prices as-is, without the preparation undertaken on auction pipeline homes; or host 
local side lot fairs in which neighborhood residents may purchase adjacent vacant lots for a nominal fee 
of $100 (more on this later). Still other disposition strategies involve issuing RFPs for multifamily 
properties, rehabbing and reselling residential properties (typically at a loss) in more stable communities, 
selling vacant lots with development mandates in targeted growth areas, and holding parcel assemblies for 
larger-scale projects in collaboration with other city agencies. Again, the means by which property enters 
DLBA inventory influences disposition strategy; targeted acquisition properties may be transferred or 
sold to specific private or nonprofit entities, or assembled for larger development projects. Passively 
received properties, on the other hand, may be disposed of in fixed-price or side lot sales, as the strategy 
for passive receipt is more often one of expedited sale to the first interested party. 
 
DLBA is a class leader in land banking on account of its myriad innovations and solutions to its unique 
issues of massive inventory scale. DLBA’s policy innovations are also attributable to Michigan’s land 
bank enabling policy itself, which facilitates the operation of land banks to a greater extent than that of 
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other states. One innovative feature DLBA has utilized is an aggressive Nuisance Abatement Program 
which identifies and seizes vacant property without compensation, and either demolishes or resells the 
property seized through either fixed-price or auction sale to the highest bidder – often at market-setting 
prices. While PA 123 was being implemented in Genesee County after its 2000 passage, in Detroit, 
Wayne County Prosecutor’s attorney Michael E. Duggan was setting nuisance abatement case law 
precedent against absentee landowners to accelerate the acquisition of derelict and dangerous structures 
by the county (State of Michigan, 2000). While well-intentioned, the end result has in some instances 
entailed or accelerated the transition of ownership and equity interest in neighborhoods to higher-income 
buyers able to afford the properties and their rehabilitation costs; instances in which it does not take a 
medium to see through the illusion of inclusivity and community equity. Through its property auction 
programs, in which homes in targeted areas of the city are sold to high bidders, sale prices have indeed 
catalyzed frenzied increases in home market values at the hands of mouse-happy bidders with deep 
pockets. DLBA’s Side Lot Program (SLP) also benefits speculative investors, who are known to purchase 
distressed residential structures and amass adjacent vacant lots at $100 each. The SLP provides a point of 
departure, as its outcomes illustrate how certain DLBA strategies may contribute to inequitable capital 
accumulation. 
 
The Side Lot Program and Equity Accumulation 
 
This particular study sought to address how much of a discount on DLBA parcels is being offered to 
whom, and in which areas of Detroit (see Appendix B for a visual representation of side lots sold versus 
property exchange values citywide). Determining the value added to a residential property through the 
inclusion of one or more side lots as a percentage of the property’s sale price can illustrate, though case 
study, how much of a value-add a $100 side lot constitutes in a neighborhood with higher property value 
as opposed to a neighborhood with lower property value.  A hedonic regression model was designed to 
allow dependent variable of sale prices to be evaluated and dissected through comparing homes’ 
independent variables. Independent variables may include construction materials and methods, features, 
dimensions, and locational characteristics; for example, siding type, architectural style, square footage, 
room count, and median home value by block group all constitute independent variables. In this study, the 
key independent variable to be observed is the inclusion of an adjacent vacant parcel or parcels. To build 
the model, MLS data for all residential structure sales within Detroit for the years 2015, 2016, and 2017 
was gathered and filtered. Apartments, condominiums, and other non-detached residential structures were 
excluded, and only detached homes were subject to analysis. Independent variables selected for analysis 
are listed in Figure 12. 
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FIGURE 12: REGRESSION ANALYSIS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
Side Lot Interaction w / Median Block Group Value* Total Room Count 
Median Home Value by Block Group* Bathroom Count 
Basement Square Footage Bedroom Count 
Year Built or Remodeled Square Footage 
Garage Parking Capacity Fireplace 
Central Air Conditioning Stories 
Brick/Masonry Siding Pool 
Finished Basement  
 
The independent variables with asterisks require some explanation. First, in determining which properties 
were sold with side lots, no easily identifiable data or table section from the MLS included a “side lot” 
field. Properties which included side lot(s) in the sale were determined one of two ways. The first way 
was via a text search of every listing for key tags such as “side lot”, “vacant lot”, “adjacent lot”, “side 
yard”, “adjacent parcel”, “vacant parcel”, or “double lot”. Performing a search for these phrases yielded 
143 sales which included extra land or parcels in addition to the home being sold; out of roughly 8,500 
total sales, this number is appreciably small. To counterbalance the small number of transactions 
including adjacent lots, the locational value of each property was also estimated. In order to determine 
how much value may be added by location within the City of Detroit, an attempt was made to geocode 
each address in order to determine which Census Block Group the property fell within. Median home 
values by block group, based on 2015 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, were then 
assigned to each geocoded address. While 2016 ACS data was also available, the dataset was less 
complete (it is worth noting, however, that certain block groups’ median property values changed over 
2015-2016). The median home value by block group, in essence, serves as a proxy to determine what the 
location by block group portends for sale prices as an independent variable. 
 
Multiple runs of the model were performed, alternating between certain independent variables in order to 
improve accuracy; irrelevant or low-frequency independent variables were excluded, such as water 
frontage, or variations of heating fuel type. The independent variable of Side Lot and the interaction of 
Side Lot and Median Home Value by Block Group were both evaluated, allowing the model to discern 
how much value the inclusion of the/a side lot would add to the median block group home value. 
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Regression Output 
 
The regression model output yields a plausible R
2
 of 0.62 (Figure 
13), in spite of the wide range and high number of outliers in the 
Detroit housing market where many homes routinely sell for well 
below market due to abandonment, deferred maintenance, 
deterioration and vandalism – irrespective of the features, square 
footage, or other variables that would otherwise add value in a normal setting. The high standard error of 
$45,901 corroborates this effect. Given the high variation of listings, this may be a difficult aspect to 
mitigate in future attempts at modeling. Controlling for fixed neighborhood characteristics, beyond the 
incorporation of median block group home values, may allay some of this variation in future models. 
 
Coefficients and Value-Add Predictions 
 
The model outputs clearly suggest issues with the observations and potentially with variable selection, 
and should be taken with more than just a grain of salt; there is little reason why normally value-adding 
features, such as additional bathrooms, should have negative coefficients. The lowest absolute coefficient, 
as it happens, is the Side Lot Interaction with Median Home Value, with the inclusion of a side lot 
implying a 0.12x change relative to the home value (albeit with a 0.11 standard error). Regarding the 
significance of coefficients observed, Square Footage, Median Home Value, Bedroom Count, Finished 
Basement, and Garage Parking Capacity all occur at the 99% confidence interval. Unfortunately, Side Lot 
Interaction falls below the 80% confidence level, implying that it is not statistically significant; however, 
the 0.12 coefficient itself is within anecdotal reason; within the raw MLS data set, certain listings 
included lots available separate for purchase, optional for an extra 10-15% of the sale price. Current 
market listings for undeveloped lots in the rapidly-appreciating North End neighborhood provide further 
anecdotal evidence corroborating that lots are typically worth one-tenth of improved properties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.79
R2 0.62
Adj. R2 0.62
Standard Error 45,901
Observations 8,497        
FIGURE 13: MODEL STATISTICS 
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Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Stat p-Value 
Median Block Group 
Home Value 
0.28 0.02 15.40 <0.01 
Bathroom Count -1,593.06 928.55 -1.72 0.09 
Bedroom Count 33,741.37 1,252.71 26.93 <0.01 
Square Footage 48.40 1.04 46.60 <0.01 
Stories -2,129.04 1,321.60 -1.61 0.11 
Side Lot 0.12 0.11 1.13 0.26 
Finished Basement 8,754.66 1,808.78 4.84 <0.01 
Masonry Siding 2987.98 1,292.92 2.31 0.02 
Central Air -436.13 1,522.02 -0.29 0.77 
Fireplaces -102.49 945.63 -0.11 0.91 
Garage Capacity 2,007.51 618.31 3.25 <0.01 
Pool 8,086.62 9,068.83 0.89 0.37 
Basement Area SF 1.91 1.39 1.37 0.17 
Year Built/Rehab 0.54 3.85 0.14 0.89 
Room Count 26.92 214.04 0.13 0.90 
 
To illustrate the variation in the value of a side lot as proportionate to home value across the City of 
Detroit, two hypothetical case study homes have been utilized as predictive models. The first home is 
located in Bagley, a neighborhood which according to ACS 5-Year estimates has seen median home 
values increase from 2015-2016, and is expected to see values increase further as planning and economic 
development efforts along the Livernois Avenue corridor gain momentum. The second home is in the 
Jefferson-Mack area east of the Conner Avenue Chrysler assembly plant. This neighborhood does not 
benefit from nearby revitalization projects or development interest, and blocks within this area are 
typified by high vacancy. Comparing predictive models based on similar homes in each neighborhood 
illustrates the point that not all side lots are created equal, and homeowners purchasing a side lot in one 
neighborhood may be given a greater “bargain” for their $100 than homeowners across town (Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: REGRESSION OUTPUTS 
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Neighborhood Median Home Value Side Lot Coefficient Side Lot Value-Add 
Bagley $59,200 0.12 $7,131 
Jefferson-Mack $13,000 0.12 $1,566 
 
Notes 
 
The effects of independent variables yielded some incongruities more difficult to find explanations for, 
and thus the model may have to be revised or revisited; examples include negative coefficients for 
additional bathrooms, stories, fireplaces, and central air. Normally, these independent variables are 
considered to have a positive effect. Again, one of the main limiting factors with this model was the 
massive variation in home condition that was undocumented or not accounted for in the raw data that was 
analyzed; as mentioned earlier, the mode did not take into account home condition upon sale, which 
would likely have played a significant role in modeling. A scaled ranking of home condition would have 
potentially improved R
2
 value and accuracy in general. Moreover, the raw data provided for this model by 
the Detroit MLS was problematic, as many instances of inaccurate figures in the raw data were detected, 
such as improper housing ages, and in particular the curious prevalence of home sale records with more 
bathrooms than bedrooms (which may explain the negative correlation observed for bathrooms). In short, 
the data itself was not perfect; in future attempts at this model, more data cleaning may be beneficial. 
 
Implications 
 
Having observed that side lots play a somewhat significant role in home value and add roughly 10-15% of 
home values (12% of median block group value), it is clear that not all side lots are worth $100. Through 
the SLP’s standardized pricing scheme, however, homeowners in areas of increasing value (whether long-
time residents, newer transplants, or speculators) are given a far greater discount to build equity in their 
neighborhoods. If side lots in appreciating areas are not sold, on the other hand, some longtime residents 
may find themselves shut out of opportunities to build equity and lay claim to land at a discount price in 
appreciating local real estate markets. While a implementing a scaled pricing and lot availability system 
by neighborhood, length of adjacent homeownership, or household income may not be politically feasible 
solutions, these may prove more equitable and inclusionary solutions to the quandary of increasing 
uniform opportunity for homeowners through the SLP. 
TABLE 3: VALUE PREDICTION 
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The Wayne County Land Bank 
 
While the DLBA is the most active land bank in Detroit by far, other land banks still hold property and 
enforce their own disposition mechanisms and strategies. The Wayne County Land Bank (WCLB), which 
was developed around the same period as the DLBA, is one. However, the realpolitik that has pervaded 
WCLB’s disposition strategies illustrates some of the abuses that land banking portends. In 2017, WCLB 
was embroiled in controversy over 141 tax-foreclosed properties acquired through ROFR that had been 
sold to nine developers hand-picked by the WCLB’s executive director without any formal selection 
process; three of those nine having ties to Wayne County (Guillen, 2017). The move was defended as 
ensuring foreclosed properties would be developed rather than sold at auction to speculators; it was also 
defended as less resource intensive than going through a public RFP process. WCLB’s executive director 
went on record claiming that “We felt the level of staff that we have – we weren’t ready to evaluate 
hundreds of proposals” (Guillen, 2017), illustrating the triage that under-resourced land banks may need 
to employ while setting a dangerous precedent. The direct conveyance of real estate assets to known 
private parties with ties to the local government through negotiated disposition and without public 
advertisement or transparency clearly illustrates how land banks may be abused as a system of patronage 
and selective disposition for the purpose of capital accumulation. This initiative, titled “Action Before 
Auction”, has continued to convey properties to selected developers through ROFR, though in its second 
year has at least included an application process to allay the concerns raised over favoritism in 2017. 
 
Action Before Auction promotes itself as an effort to stop the negative consequences of the yearly 
auction, which include speculation, eviction, and recurring tax foreclosures. These are all logical goals; 
through the Wayne County Tax Foreclosure Auction, properties countywide have often been purchased in 
bulk by absentee investors or investment companies only to be written off, abandoned, and returned to tax 
foreclosure, perpetuating the cycle of abandonment in spite of Michigan’s already-expedited tax 
foreclosure laws. Despite Wayne County’s stated intentions in stemming speculation and keeping 
homeowners within their homes, Action Before Auction has in practice enriched developers and 
dispossessed tax-delinquent homeowners of their properties for the benefit of more well-resourced 
development interests. The initiative already has a documented history of selling properties at a discount 
to pre-selected developers who evict residents and resell properties at significant profit (Gross, 2019). 
Indeed, the actions of WCLB in dispossessing homeowners for the benefit of capital accumulation may be 
contrary to what early proponents envisioned in land banking as a tool to advance the “public good”. 
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Alternative Land Bank Models: New York City’s Proposed CLT Approach 
 
Land banks typically operate in areas of high disinvestment and abandonment. While New York City may 
not be thought of as such, between the 1960s and 1990s many neighborhoods of New York were beset by 
crippling disinvestment and abandonment, to the point that by the late 1970s, New York City housing 
administrator Roger Starr advance proposals for “shrinking” parts of Brooklyn and the Bronx by cutting 
off city services and infrastructure to them (Jonnes, 1986). The phenomenon did not endure long, as the 
refashioning of New York’s economy to one dependent on financial and professional services from the 
1970s onwards, a concerted rebranding strategy, and state-enabled public development support brought 
massive investment back to the city by the turn of the new millennium. 
 
Throughout its tenure as a major owner of last resort, New York City never employed land banking; state 
legislation that would enable land banking would not be passed until the late 2000s. New York City’s real 
estate management and disposition functions have been and remain the purview of New York City. 
Despite the city’s size, performance of management and disposition functions by the city itself has not 
hindered New York’s redevelopment. Of course, institutional resources unavailable to most other cities 
have facilitated this success. New York City was able to leverage bonds, a strong capital budget, luxury 
development cross-subsidies from high-value areas, payment-in-lieu-of-taxes from the World Trade 
Center, and other sources to fund its ambitions redevelopment programs. For example, in the 1980s, New 
York City successfully rehabilitated nearly all its public-owned housing units through a combination of 
incentives, partnerships with for-profit and nonprofit developers, and tenant-centered co-op homesteading 
models (Koch, 1985). Mayor Ed Koch’s tenure saw the successful disposition or conversion of thousands 
of previously abandoned, publicly-owned units into productive (i.e. tax-generating and/or improved) 
reuse, predominantly as affordable housing – though the definition of how affordable, and to whom, 
remains up for debate (Soffer, 2010). The subsequent narrative of many New York City neighborhoods 
has changed from disinvestment and dereliction to rapidly-appreciating real estate values and 
displacement, and New York City is once again experiencing an affordable housing crisis (albeit of a 
different nature, and for different reasons). 
 
New York City’s disposition strategy is not easily or readily replicable, considering the complexity of 
state and local-level regulations that govern land disposition and the diversity of city agencies that may 
lay claim to land for their own needs or purposes and subject to their own disposition strategies. Many 
land-owning agencies may work at cross-purpose to one another, or to other city agencies; for example, 
while the Office of Management and Budget (responsible for city finances) or Department of Citywide 
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Administrative Services (responsible for the management of city-owned real estate in general) may seek 
to sell property quickly in order to thin inventory, reduce maintenance and management costs, and capture 
sales revenue, departments such as Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) or the NYC Economic 
Development Corporation (EDC) favor longer-term holding periods or property assemblages for strategic 
development projects and dispositions. New York’s disposition processes have also changed over time. In 
the present day, virtually all surplus or abandoned New York City real estate is disposed of via ground 
lease, allowing the city to retain ownership of the land, with the exception of a few programs including 
HPD’s “Third Party Transfer” system which transfers in rem properties to a non-profit organization 
(Neighborhood Restore) for affordable housing rehabilitation. With regard to in rem properties and New 
York City’s tax foreclosure process, tax liens on delinquent properties are typically sold to a third-party 
collection agency, a strategy eschewed by most land bank enabling statutes in preference of land banks’ 
direct assumption of ownership. 
 
Land Banking and New York City: Similarities and Differences 
 
New York City’s management and disposition functions have encountered many of the same challenges 
that land banks have, though have benefited from not having to encounter challenges common to land 
banks. Like many land banks, New York’s management and disposition functions during the 1980s and 
1990s encountered growing pains endemic to public-sector real estate disposition, including occasional 
accusations of non-transparency, the contested formulation of disposition strategies for specific contexts, 
and the challenges associated with thinning a massive portfolio of abandoned property. Like many other 
land banks, New York City’s surplus real estate was acquired primarily in passive receipt, with New York 
becoming the owner of last resort of large swaths of neighborhoods in the city’s outer boroughs Where 
New York’s public sector differed from many other land banks was in institutional resource availability, 
the exogenous revitalization of the city’s economic activity in professional service sectors on a large 
scale, and the contemporaneous rise in market demand for real estate. Despite the nuances that allowed 
New York to largely resolve its once-crippling issues of property abandonment and disinvestment in-
house and without resort to land banking, to an extent lessons from New York’s experience with public-
sector real estate disposition may be valuable to land banks operating in cities with localized potential for 
rapid growth. New York currently struggles to maintain an adequate provision of affordable housing 
stock, and the ongoing exclusion of longtime residents from gentrifying communities has (rather 
lamentably) long since become a local trope. 
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A New Approach for New York City: CLT-Oriented Land Banking 
 
In 2016, the office of City Comptroller Scott M. Stringer released a policy report laying out the potential 
for a New York City land bank, which was framed as a tool to preserve housing affordability in New 
York. The reasoning behind Stringer’s report was a perception that New York City had sold too much of 
its public real estate outright to developers, in exchange for a pittance of affordable units to be developed 
either on site or elsewhere (NYC Office of the Comptroller, 2016) – this despite the fact that virtually all 
city dispositions outside of Third Party Transfer occur via ground lease, which allows the City of New 
York to retain crucial control over development outcomes on its land. The report referenced land banks in 
St. Louis, Cleveland, Buffalo, and Syracuse as useful tools for reactivating vacant or unused property for 
“important civic purposes” (NYC Office of the Comptroller, 2016). The selection of these particular 
examples is curious, given New York City’s vast differences from smaller and more economically and 
resource-challenged cities facing chronic issues of property abandonment. The comparison to Buffalo and 
Syracuse is at least logical, as New York State passed its land bank enabling legislation in 2011, leading 
to the formation of land banks in several smaller and post-industrial cities across the state. However, 
rather than being another attempt at jumping on the land banking policy bandwagon, Scott Stringer’s 
report introduces a novel concept in land banking that has yet to be deployed to great extent; the policy 
hybridization of land banking with community land trusts (CLTs). 
 
Community land trusts and land banks are often conflated, while in actuality they are quite different and 
may even work at cross-purposes. Whereas land banks are government-empowered vehicles for the 
revitalization and productive reuse of vacant property by any means necessary and with little interest in 
post-disposition outcomes, community land trusts are traditionally private nonprofits that hold land in 
trust to provide affordable housing and other community assets in perpetuity (Graziani, 2016). Land 
banks are not – and have not been – explicitly intended to promote housing affordability; and due to 
resource limitations, land banks may have to work more with for-profit or nonprofit developers rather 
than holding properties in a similar fashion to or for use by a CLT (Graziani, 2016). As Scott Stringer’s 
report suggests, CLT models make more sense in areas experiencing rapid increases in property values 
and decreases in affordability levels, such as New York City. While New York City’s warming to the idea 
of land banking as a CLT strategy may speak to unexplored avenues for the extrinsic mutability of land 
banking policy, perhaps the most valuable point somewhat buried by the report is the potential for land 
banks and CLTs to complement each other from the outset, as opposed to further down the line when the 
damage to affordability and community inclusion has already been done. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
For all the discussion surrounding land banking over the past two decades, there remains a paucity of 
critical thought on the practical application of land banking. Evaluations have relied on quantitative 
assessments to highlight success, while the very operationalization and indirect effects of land banking 
and land banks have not been substantively questioned. Irrespective, the land banking model shows no 
sign of being substantially altered or renounced any time soon. The policy entrepreneurs that refined and 
promulgated the land banking model have diffused land banking nationwide – and potentially beyond, as 
Frank Alexander has more recently suggested the applicability of his land banking model in localities as 
far-flung (and presumably different from Genesee County) as China (Alexander, 2015). On account of its 
intrinsic mutability and bipartisan appeal to both pro-market and pro-social justice sensibilities, land 
banking has flourished as a policy fix, particularly in disinvested areas where abandonment’s detrimental 
effects are seen and felt most. Land banks have also been incorporated into economic development policy 
toolkits, particularly in instances where land banks are not the owners of last resort and have the ability 
(or the mandate) to build inventory through targeted acquisition. 
 
The use of land banking as a tool for economic development hearkens back to when land banking was 
little more than a fringe topic in land use law and urban planning policy circles, proposed as a means of 
controlling urban growth. While the earliest land banks in St. Louis and Cleveland were reactionary, and 
developed as a means of controlling urban decline, land banks in the fashion of Genesee County have 
occasionally reassumed the role of a growth control mechanism. However, whereas land banking was 
initially imagined as a means of controlling the outward expansion of urban development, growth-
management strategies in the latter day involve the revalorization and control over growth within already 
hollowed-out urban cores. Patchworks of localized growth and disinvestment emerging from the spatial 
redistribution of capital accumulation indirectly led to the need for land banks; and as capital 
accumulation shifts back to formerly disinvested areas, some land banks are in a position to extract as 
much value as possible from the ebbs and flows of an ongoing creative destruction in which value is 
extracted from and reapportioned to land. The land banks that exist today may be thought of thus as both 
the products and complicit actors of an actually existing neoliberalism, acting through established legal 
frameworks and path-dependencies, that has pervaded national and local systems of governance writ large 
over the past several decades. 
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In this context, the rapid policy diffusion of land banking since the early 2000s may not come as much of 
a surprise; as local governments have become leaner and more entrepreneurial, so have their policy fixes. 
Yet were it not for the Genesee County Land Bank and the model it created, it can only be imagined how 
land banks would have diffused to the extent that they did. Land banking’s policy diffusion was catalyzed 
primarily on account of the “policy window” that opened in Michigan at the turn of the millennium; and 
while the exact reason (or reasons) why tax foreclosure reform became a focusing event in late 1990s 
Michigan proves elusive, the success story of the Genesee County Land Bank is certainly remarkable, and 
provides a compelling case study in policy creation and policy mobilities research. Land banking in the 
mid-2000s reflected many of the features and mobility characteristics that have accompanied other “fast” 
policies in their diffusion (Peck and Theodore, 2015). One of these characteristics is that beyond the 
handful of features needed for the basic land bank model (i.e. tax foreclosure reform, land bank enabling 
statutes, property transfer and funding mechanisms), land banks can also be fairly versatile; and 
depending on the regulatory and market context in which land banks operate, they can work toward 
markedly different goals. Some of the main differentiating factors between land banks are the condition of 
their local markets, their level of institutional support and funding structures, and their acquisition 
mechanisms, and whether land banks primarily build inventory through deliberate (creation, targeted 
acquisition, or active receipt) or de facto (passive receipt) acquisition methods is worth noting on a case-
by-case basis, as these contexts may largely influence implementation and, more importantly for this 
thesis, disposition strategies. 
 
Land bank disposition strategies are where the rubber meets the road, colloquially – where policy is 
directly translated into practice, and where land banking’s entrepreneurial bent often shows most. 
Through the selected case studies observed within this thesis, it is clear that the triage employed by land 
banks may lead to less-than-equitable planning and development outcomes. And while members of the 
nonprofit, philanthropic, and urban policy communities lambasted vacant land and abandonment as social 
injustice in their initial support for land banks, land banks and their main policy creators themselves have 
made no qualms – and most certainly not through their praxis – about their neglect to ameliorate other 
potential injustices. One point that the case studies attempts to make clear is that land banks do not 
promote inclusionary or equitable outcomes by default, and can exacerbate socially regressive outcomes. 
At worst, land banks may be corrupted by a realpolitik that explicitly dispossesses the lesser off for 
preferential capital accumulation. However, land banks may uphold social justice and inclusion and 
countervail the influence of actually existing neoliberalism based on how they are applied. 
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On the other hand, subjective application of land banking also portends its greatest hope for advancing 
more inclusionary “productive use” end-state goals for disposition or land reprogramming. Land banks 
may draw from the earliest models of land banking in retaining control over land through long-term or 
permanent holding strategies. Ground leases are one method of retaining heightened control over land 
use, and ground leases were used extensively by land banks in northern Europe well before the advent of 
land banking in the U.S. Within the U.S., New York City has made extensive use of ground lease 
structures in its property disposition strategy. New York has notably also proposed a novel idea in land 
banking; the hybridization of land banking with a community land trust model. CLTs, while less 
formalized than land banks, are more attuned to long-term holding strategies in their mission to keep land 
(primarily housing) permanently affordable through ownership by a trust. CLT long-term holding 
strategies and relatively minimal profit motives may not bode well for justifying readily-quantifiable 
investment returns, but may be a valuable complement to land banking, and not only in high-value 
markets. At the same time, CLTs can be considered even more entrepreneurial in nature than land banks, 
given that CLTs must typically make do with even fewer resources to cover otherwise comparable costs 
for land stewardship, even before the development and maintenance costs of affordable cooperatives are 
considered. 
 
Understandably, land banks have enjoyed the cooperation and sponsorship of local government while 
CLTs typically have not, and the diffusion of CLTs has been appreciably limited in comparison. The 
fundamental difference between CLTs and land banks can be conceptualized as land banks experiencing a 
disposition problem given large inventories of abandoned, surplus, or low-value land and a need for 
responsible parties to transfer title to, with CLTs experiencing more of an acquisition problem given lack 
of funding resources for assembling land, particularly in appreciating or higher-value areas (Davis, 2012). 
To this end, the main thrust behind New York City’s land bank proposal entailed using a land bank as an 
acquisition mechanism with the ability to leverage tax foreclosed and surplus public properties for 
establishing affordable cooperatives, as such cooperatives would normally be shut out of New York’s 
competitive real estate market. Yet such CLT/land bank collaborations may be more effective when 
deployed in less-appreciated areas as they begin to appreciate, as opposed to land banks leveraging 
market appreciation through revenue-maximizing disposition strategies. One of the main features of land 
banking is its relative flexibility; once all of the legal and organizational bases are covered, how a land 
bank creates and deploys its strategy may leave room for intrinsic and extrinsic policy mutations. The 
hybridization of CLTs with land banks is one particular area where future research may consider shedding 
light on the localities in which land banks and CLTs operate contemporaneously, how feasible such a 
policy hybrid may prove in practice, and the sources and uses needed to make it work. 
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